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PREFACE
The following study is an attempt at a definition of 
Tragedy. It is primarily a theoretical work, concerned with 
the enunciation and clarification of the theory rather than 
with a critical application of that theory. However, some 
partially critical application and testing of the definition 
seemed useful and desirable; thus the nature of Chapters III, 
IV, and V. But here again, the basic interest is theoreti­
cal; an elaboration and clarification of the definition.
No attempt has been made, therefore, to examine 
"critically" a large body of "Tragedies." Such an attempt 
would have destroyed the unity of the work while at the same 
time drawing attention away from the central concern. I 
have, instead, thought it expedient and reasonable to e x e m ­
plify my definition of Tragedy by using it as a means of 
understanding three very different but unquestionably dis t i n c ­
tive kinds of "Tragedies": incontestably great Tragedies,
what I have called theodicies, and the uniquely neo-classical 
heroic tragedy. Thus the investigation of each of these 
plays is intended to be exemplary of the definition, not a 
critical study of the individual play. Obviously much more 
can and must be said about the plays as literary works, as
iv
dramas, as indices to the thought and expression of their 
time. I have sought, merely, to draw attention to their 
existence as Tragedy, and to restrict myself to that labor 
only.
Nor is this study in any sense historical. I have 
arranged the examination of individual works according to age 
only because it seemed natural and convenient to do so. And 
I have elected to treat the Greek, the Renaissance, and the 
neo-classic drama not so much because of the ages as because 
of their obvious importance in studies of the drama. Chapter 
V deserves, in this respect, particular comment. It is, of 
course, largely historical, but this has seemed to me u n ­
avoidable. My examination of neo-classic tragedy, like that 
of the theodicies, seemed a necessary addition to a clarifi­
cation of what I conceive to be the peculiarly "tragic" 
features of Tragedy. Thus the interest here is in it as 
type. But in order to characterize the type and thus to 
point to the particular limitations it has as Tragedy (and 
thereby further to define Tragedy), I thought it necessary 
to construct a basically historical characterization.
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THE MORTAL CONDITION; A DEFINITION OF TRAGEDY
CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF TRAGEDY
We look before and after, Shelley says, and pine for 
what is not. And within this statement we can see the 
reasons why man finds Evil in the world, as well as, u l t i ­
mately, one of the primary bases of Tragedy. For although 
man lives (and dies) in time, and cannot but know himself 
caught in its forward march, yet he lives a life of the 
spirit that transcends time, that is beyond time. He does 
look (agonizingly) before and after--to contemplate the in­
evitability of his own death, to reflect on past suffering, 
to discover within his own person, endlessly torn between 
the rival claims of finitude and infinity, the Mortal Condi­
tion. Perhaps he pines for what is not: certainly he
repines against what is. He ponders the evidence that there 
is unmerited suffering in the world, that no principle of 
Justice manifests itself in the pattern of mortality. So 
with a profound sense of sorrow but also of mystery, he writes 
the story of Job. But Justice, he thinks, must be, for he 
feels the injustice of the lot of man, which can only be
1
2judged against the existent principle of Justice, without 
which both the concept injustice and man's life are me a n i n g ­
less. But since the order of Justice is not perceived by 
man, it must be of and with God, who is of necessity just; 
"For," as Richmond Hathorn says, "if God be not just, where 
is justice to be found, whereby we may even justify our dis­
approval of its absence?"^ He then writes a theodicy. Or 
he may, in his contemplation of the Mortal Condition, recog­
nizing the limit of his vision and the need for hope, but 
feeling the sorrow and the mystery, celebrate the spirit of 
man in this situation. And he writes Tragedy,
But what is this Tragedy? What is the nature of this 
work man produces? What its essence? For at least 2,300 
years western man has diligently and exhaustively sought 
answers to these questions; almost none have suggested that 
they are meaningless. The very persistence with which we 
ask these questions, then, establishes clearly that the 
existence of something we call Tragedy is a fact which we 
can all recognize, even if we cannot always define or explain 
it. The questions show that those productions of the human 
spirit which we call Tragedy share all some common quality-- 
a quality that has been defined in terms of everything from 
dramatic structure to "world view."
But if most men agree that something called Tragedy
^Richmond Y. Hathorn, T r a g e d y , M y t h , and Mystery 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 55.
3exists and that they can recognize it when it is shown in 
literature, why, one asks, has it been so impossible to agree 
on a definition or description of its primary nature?
One of the first answers to the question is a st a t e ­
ment of the obvious: that the meanings of words and concepts
change; and the equally obvious, that unless one is aware (as 
he often is not) that the meaning he is giving to a term is 
not the same as that given by another, then serious confu­
sions and distortions can ensue. Do we mean, in short, the 
same by Tragedy as Aristotle does by Are we
trying to define and identify the same thing? I suggest we 
are not, that we are, in fact, dealing with a more limited 
(more closely d e f i n e d ) concept and feature of human experi­
ence than Aristotle. I suggest further that whatever may 
have been the influences of Aristotle's theory on subsequent 
critics and philosophers, whatever the influence on writers 
of Tragedy, whatever the confusions and misunderstandings
^In all of the following discussion of Aristotle's 
P o e t i c s , I am less concerned with discovering Aristotle's 
meaning than I am with clarifying the problem of trying to 
define Tragedy by means of the standard uses of Aristotle.
It seems to me that the Poetics is often so employed as to 
stand in the way of a clear understanding of the nature of 
Tragedy. It is true, of course, that Aristotle's remarks in 
the Poetics grew out of and should be viewed in relation to 
an entire philosophic system. However, it is equally true 
that none of the larger scope of that system is ordinarily 
employed by critics when they bring Aristotle to their aid 
in an attempt to define Tragedy. And certainly if these 
concerns (what I here call the "heart" of Tragedy) are b e ­
hind Aristotle's reflections on Tragedy, they are not at the 
center of his formal remarks on it, so that students of 
Aristotle might be forgiven for thinking that these concerns 
are not central to his definition.
4that have followed from his remarks, or whatever Aristotle 
did in fact mean by % still we today share, largely,
a concept of Tragedy that embraces the Greek as well as more 
"modern" drama and that we should above all attempt to find 
out what it is that this concept does embrace. It is of 
little importance that we cannot always say what it enc o m ­
passes, What is important is that we do know generally what 
it does not encompass, and clearly that a positive content 
exists. We know that there is something that literature can 
express about the life of man as he sees it that is not 
dependent on historical theory or the conscious world view 
of a particular period. And we know, finally, that this 
something, called Tragedy by us, emerges at different times 
and with varying degrees of realization of the idea Tragedy, 
and that as the individual expressions approach nearer to 
the idea Tragedy we judge them to be among the very noblest 
of man's creations.
We generally think of the form of Tragedy as d r a m a ­
tic, even though we find in other literary forms many e l e ­
ments of what we think of as tragic. And even though P r o ­
fessor Henry A. Myers makes a good case for Moby Dick as 
Tragedy, he is careful to point out that Melville's book is 
essentially dramatic in structure and effect.^ In other 
words, students of Tragedy seem to be agreed that a necessary
^ Tragedy ; ^  Vlew of Life (Ithaca: Cornell U n i v e r ­
sity Press, 1956).
5feature of Tragedy is the dramatic involvement of character 
or characters and the dramatic revelation of the meaning of 
their predicament. Thus it has seemed logical to many to 
attempt to find within the form itself the essence of Trage­
dy; within the characterization, the construction and 
manipulation of scene, the language or speeches, the use of 
verse or non-verse, and the even more mechanical and super­
ficial features of dramaturgy. Indeed Aristotle devoted a 
considerable portion of his study of drama in the Poetics to 
these matters. Moreover, some very rewarding recent studies 
have been made from this approach, but they seem to tell us 
something about the nature of great dramatic art and little 
about Tragedy itself. Often these investigations help us to 
see the shortcomings of individual poets or even to und e r ­
stand more clearly the critical assumptions and pr o n o u n c e ­
ments that underlay the artistic aberrations of talented 
poets, but once again they take us no nearer to the heart of 
Tragedy. We must, then, in our search for the meaning of 
Tragedy, leave aside this fascinating, and valuable, area of 
inquiry, which has been often and illuminatingly treated.
We must, I believe, in order not to be led down wandering 
paths and byways, assume at first a great artistic sensi­
bility and competence for the poet and concentrate on what 
is revealed through them.
But to think of Tragedy without thinking of Aris­
totle and the familiar, if puzzling, terms pity and fear.
5ha m a r t i a , and catharsis is impossible. One needs, therefore, 
to examine Aristotle's theory in order to see what help it 
affords and where it leads one away from the central inquiry.
"Aristotle's [theory] . . . ," says Gerald Else in
his recent study of the Poe t i c s , "is divorced from m e t a ­
physics and grounded in psychology--a new psychology. It 
starts from the premise, not that tragedy must adumbrate the 
metaphysical truth about human affairs, but that the best 
tragedy must arouse pity and fear in the highest possible 
degree."^ The end, the function, of Tragedy, according to 
Aristotle, is to have a psychological effect on the audience, 
to cause them to experience pity and fear intensely. But 
even though we may well agree that true (or the best ) Tragedy 
does in fact cause us to experience either one or both these 
emotions, to assume at the outset that to raise these e m o ­
tions is the end of Tragedy before we have found what Tragedy 
is seems at best premature.
Aristotle's concept of catharsis is a more difficult 
problem. If it means what it has long been thought to mean, 
that Tragedy effects a cleansing, so to speak, of the soul 
of the spectator by causing a discharge of an excess of the 
emotions of pity and fear, or, alternately, that it purifies 
the emotions themselves in the spectator by ordering and 
limiting them--then we could say that this judgment too is
^Gerald F. Else, Aristotle's Poetics ; The Argument 
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press! 195 7), p. 389.
7premature; because this again is a statement of the end of 
Tragedy, made before the thing itself has been defined. 
Moreover, commentators on Aristotle have found it increas­
ingly difficult to find such a seemingly crude notion of the 
function of Tragedy congenial. And it remains, according to 
these views of its meaning, an hypothesis on the psychologi­
cal effects of Tragedy on the individual, even if that 
individual be defined as the ideal, rather than real, 
sp e c t a t o r .
However, Else has brought forward quite another view
of the import of catharsis in Aristotle's theory. Aristotle
is not speaking. Else declares, of an end result of Tragedy,
but of "a process . . . and a process operated by the poet
through his 'structure of e v e n t s . * Catharsis is not a 
final purging of the emotions of the audience, but rather a 
purging, by the poet, of guilt from the tragic figure within 
the play. Thus construction and movement of the plot are 
such that the poet can cause the dramatic figure to emerge 
as, though perhaps guilty of some crime, at least free from 
the blood curse that should attach to the crime. This view, 
then, would remove catharsis as a statement of the end r e ­
sult of Tragedy, for as Else says, "if catharsis depends on 
the constructive activity of the poet, it ceases to be a 
standard result automatically attained by any play called
l l b i d . , p. 230.
't r a g e d y . •
But Else goes on to say that even if catharsis is 
not the telos of Tragedy it is an element necessary to the 
raising of pity and fear, and thereby tragic pleasure, in the 
audience. For catharsis is finally, according to Else, an 
activity of the spectator, an activity brought about by the 
"process" of the poet in constructing the play; that is, the 
reader judges the actions of the tragic man and sees him as 
free from the pollution that the act would bring ordinarily; 
"the purification of the p a t h o s , that is, the exculpation of 
the hero's motive from polluted intent, is precedent to our 
feeling pity for h i m ."  ^ Clearly, then, even if we accept 
Else's explication of the term c a t h a r s i s , we are brought 
back to a discussion not only of the telos of Tragedy, but 
of the telos as a producing of a psychological effect on the 
audience. But this is still premature.
The doctrine of hamartia in Aristotle's theory of 
Tragedy has a venerable and important history in both the 
study and production of tragic drama. In this doctrine, 
students of Tragedy (critics, philosophers, and poets alike) 
have seemed to find the central characteristic that distin­
guishes the truly tragic figure from the one who is simply 
a victim of misfortune. The notion of hamartia is usually
^ I bid. , p. 231.
^Ibid. , p. 447.
9seen as closely bound up with that of the "good man" as 
tragic figure, who, Aristotle says, is the only suitable 
person, since the fall of a bad man cannot awake that sym­
pathy (pity) for unmerited suffering that is necessary to the 
proper response to Tragedy. But since, further, the fall of 
a blameless good man brings only moral revulsion, his good­
ness must be tempered with some fault. Here, according to 
the more or less standard view, is the function of hamar t i a . 
Hamartia is that failing (either of judgment or of charac­
ter) that renders the "good man," the suitable tragic 
figure, imperfect enough for his fall to bring with it pity 
instead of revulsion. This is the view that gave rise to 
the doctrine of the "tragic flaw," which has held sway off 
and on since the Renaissance.
But many objections to Aristotle have risen on this 
point, in recent years especially. D. D. Raphael, for 
instance, has charged Aristotle with a contradiction, m a i n ­
taining that he cannot have it both ways. Either pity or 
h a m a r t i a , he demands, not both; "if hamartia is responsible, 
there cannot be pity, and if pity is appropriate, hamartia 
cannot take the b l a m e . W h a t  Raphael argues is that if 
pity is appropriate only when suffering is unmerited, then 
one is contradicting himself when he says that hamartia makes 
the sufferer partially responsible for his misfortune (if
^ The Paradox of Tragedy (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 196ÔT, pp. 22-23.
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not, indeed, guilty of a crime) and therefore more worthy 
of pity. Yet this objection would appear to be based on 
disagreement with the assumption that the sufferings of the 
simply good man bring moral outrage rather than pity, a d is­
agreement that is an example of another kind of objection 
that can be made to Aristotle. Surely the belief that under­
lies Raphael's logic is that one can in fact pity the simply 
good man. And this is a very persuasive belief.
Again, however. Else has offered a different view 
of Aristotle's meaning. According to Aristotle, he says, 
poetry is portraying not merely "'men in action,' but also 
'men of action.'"^ Thus the "good man" is the "man of 
action," not one who is blameless. He is of that class of 
men who strive for virtue, who spend (and perhaps lose) their 
lives in striving for it. The dichotomy between good and bad 
is absolute; either one does or does not strive for virtue. 
If one does, he is a good man; if one does not, he is not a 
good man. The former is serious and can be taken seriously; 
the latter is not and can not.
And hamartia Else takes to be not an essential part 
of the tragic figure's character, but one of three essential 
elements in the best tragic incident. It works reciprocally 
with "recognition" and "reversal" to produce the incident 
best suited to achieve the tragic effect. Thus hamartia is
^Op. c i t . , p. 73.
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not a tragic flaw or the establishing of guilt or responsi­
bility in the tragic figure, but merely an ignorance of 
events or persons that must precede recognition and thereby 
reversal.^
Yet while one is trying to decide whether to accept 
Else's judgment that hamartia is not a crucial element in 
the character of the tragic figure, and whether Aristotle's 
dictum does in fact give an insight into an essential feature 
of Tragedy, he must pause to remember that " ^  Jt / does
not in itself connote 'tragic,' but 'serious drama'" in 
Aristotle. Therefore some of what seem contradictions or 
irrelevancies to us may well proceed from the fact that at 
one time Aristotle is speaking of what we think of as Trage­
dy and at another of serious, but not tragic, drama. But if 
Aristotle is not at all times speaking of Tragedy, then one 
must clarify for oneself what Tragedy is before he can 
determine what of Aristotle is germane and helpful.
Moreover, "there is in fact not a word in the Poetics 
about the ultimate 'secrets of life,' about why mankind 
should suffer or be happy, about Fate or man's relation to 
God, or any such metaphysical matters." As Richard Sewall 
says, of the Greek "account of all the forces, within and 
without, that make for man's destruction, all that afflicts,
^ I b i d ., especially pp. 378 ff. and pp. 412-421.
^I b i d ., p. 330, n. 101.
^Ibid. , p. 306.
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mystifies, and bears him down, all that he knows as Evil"-- 
of all this "Aristotle is singularly silent . . . but it is
the essence and core of tragedy."^ Here is a serious and
central objection to Aristotle, for he is indeed strangely 
silent about the very springs of Tragedy. And though much 
of the Poetics may be found to harmonize with the results 
of an investigation of these springs, still the investigation
is not Aristotle's and must go beyond him.
Thus we must leave Aristotle, at least for a time.
In a search for the meaning and nature of Tragedy, we are 
not concerned to understand what the Greeks conceived Trage­
dy to be in theory--or the English, or the French. We are 
concerned to discover what that is which, when discovered 
or achieved in any period by any people, and whatever their 
understanding of its nature, we can and do label Tragedy.
And we may well find that "tragedy in its greatest days 
comported things that were not dreamt of in Aristotle's 
p h i l o s o p h y .
^ The Vision of Tragedy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 195 9), p. *+7.
2
Else, op. cit. , p. 446.
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF TRAGEDY
One of the distinguishing features of comedy is that 
it is funny, as Dennis acutely observed.^ And a memory of 
this fact helps to prevent us from overloading terms that 
distinguish types of dramatic literature until they no longer 
serve to distinguish. Clearly one cannot call everything 
that is not tragic "comic" and still hope that the designa­
tion will cast any appreciable light on the work so classi­
fied. And although the traditional classification of 
Shakespeare's plays into comedies, tragedies, and histories 
indicates well enough, perhaps, a general awarenes: of this
critical maxim, at the same time, the continuing attempt to 
break down Shakespeare's "comedies" into "dark" and "light," 
"problem" (or tragi-comic) and simple indicates perhaps 
equally well that the awareness is not always heeded.
Thus it will perhaps not be superfluous to observe
that just as comedy is funny. Tragedy, as George Steiner
2
says, ends badly. Tragedy is not simply non-comic drama.
Ijohn Dennis, The Critical Works of John D e n n i s , ed. 
Edward Niles Hooker (2 vols.; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1943), II, 160.
^The Death of Tragedy (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 8.
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Neither is it all drama that treats the problems of man with 
great seriousness. Tragedy presents man suffering. Indeed, 
at the heart of Tragedy are the death and destruction of man. 
Tragedy rises up out of the defeat and death that punctuate 
with inexorable regularity and finality the life of mortal 
m a n .
In one sense, Tragedy is a mirror of life. It 
focuses attention on the unhappy (and inevitable) features 
of the mortal condition: that the body is liable to sick­
ness, disease, decay, death; that the will is infirm; that 
man suffers self-division over baser inclinations and moral 
(or spiritual) "oughts." Fulke Greville attempts to describe 
this mortal condition in Mustapha :
Oh, wearisome Condition of Humanity!
Borne under one Law, to another bound:
Vainely begot, and yet forbidden vanity.
Created sicke, commanded to be sound:
What meaneth Nature by these diuerse Lawes?
Passion and Reason, self-diuision cause.
Is it the marke, or Maiesty of Power 
To make offences that it may forgiue?
Nature herself doth her owne selfe defloure.
To hate those errors she her self doth giue.^
In other words. Tragedy focuses on the existence of Evil in
the world. "All Tragedy," D. D. Raphael says, "deals with
2
the presentation of evil . . . ." "The first business of
the tragic dramatist," he says further, "is to express the
^Poems and Dramas of Fulke G r e v i l l e , ed. Geoffrey 
Bullough (2 vols. ; Edinburgh : Oliver and Boyd, n.d.), II,
136.
^Op. cit. , p. 25.
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disturbing character of the existence of evil . . , But
whether or not the first business of the tragic dramatist is 
to express this disturbing character, certainly an awareness 
of it is a prerequisite to his writing Tragedy. He must be 
aware that by nature man is subject to pain, misery, want, 
frustration, and defeat. Before he produces Tragedy he must 
feel the full measure of man's mortality and the natural 
sense of outrage or injustice that is consequent to his 
capacity so to reflect on his condition.
But of course a recognition of the existence of Evil 
does not always produce Tragedy, or even the "tragic view." 
It may produce attempts to "account" for Evil, to justify 
God's ways to man: anything from Job to Paradise L o s t . Or
it may produce a conviction that in a world in which Evil 
exists there can be no Justice or a God of Justice. M o r e ­
over, much of lyric poetry seems to proceed from this same 
recognition of the existence of Evil. And yet these produc­
tions are not Tragedies. Often they are very serious, some­
times profoundly moving and intellectually satisfying; but 
we do not call them tragic in the same sense as A n t i g o n e .
We must, therefore, refer to something more (though not 
other) than a recognition of the existence of Evil when we 
speak of Tragedy.
This "something more" is often identified as the
^ I b i d .
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nobility of the tragic figure, what Raphael calls his gran­
deur d * a m e ,^ We admire the tragic hero, so the argument 
goes, not simply because he is noble in his fall, but b e ­
cause he is spiritually triumphant even though physically 
defeated. Thus his fall is spiritually elevating.
The hero is a man like us, showing human weaknesses from 
which the devices of art free us for the nonce; but 
though an object of our sympathy, he seems sublime, for 
he outstrips us, and the superior powers whom he opposes, 
in greatness of spirit. And our sympathy for him as a 
fellow human being gives his sublimity a stronger appeal 
than that exerted by the sublimity of the alien power 
with which he contends. By such devices Tragedy exalts 
man in our eyes.^
This is a good point. Surely it isolates one of the central
effects of Tragedy; but what it most reveals is another
assumption about the nature of Tragedy, an assumption that
is not so acceptable. It pictures man in a struggle against
external, alien powers, just as Steiner does when he speaks
of the "forces" that defeat man. This kind of assumption
has led to the attempts at identification of the particular
"force" that is operative in each individual Tragedy, such
as Fate, Fortune, the Gods, Nature, or a Manichaean power
of Evil.
But the central feature of Tragedy is that the tragic 
figure is not defeated by some alien force. The presentation
^ I b i d . , pp. 26 ff.
2 % b i d . , p. 31.
3
Op. cit. , p. 8.
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of the mortal condition is such as to make the Mortal Condi­
tion itself the antagonist. Tragic man is' not defeated by 
some wholly external force (nor by a wholly internal one), 
but by the Mortal Condition, in which he finds himself and 
which subsists in him: it is neither external nor internal,
but both.
Tragedy does deal with the presentation of Evil; but 
more specifically it deals with man's (the tragic hero's) 
confrontation with it. In Tragedy man runs head-on into 
Evil, and he must struggle with it as he attempts to live. 
And he of course externalizes Evil. He views it as an 
existent force outside himself and with which he must con­
tend. Moreover, since Evil threatens his life as rational- 
spiritual-physical being, he feels that he must combat it. 
But Tragedy discovers in his struggles with Evil that (what­
ever of its features the particular tragic figure contends 
with) it is not simply external. It discovers that to act 
is to become a part of that against which one acts. It 
reveals, in short, that Evil is an essential part of the 
Mortal Condition, and therefore ineradicable. As we see in 
Hamlet, men become "a little soiled i ' the working."^
Tragic man emerges as both doer and sufferer. The 
Mortal Condition is more than he is: it surrounds him and
engulfs him--and it defeats him. But it does also subsist
^The Cambridge Edition of the Works of William 
Shakespeare, ed. John Dover Wilson, The Tragedy of H a m l e t , 
Prince of Denmark (Cambridge: at the University Press,
1936 ) , II.i.40.
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in him, and only in him. He resists or attacks that part of 
the Mortal Condition which he has identified as Evil, and 
through the Mortal Condition he is defeated and defeats him­
self. Tragedy focuses on this feature of mortality with such 
force and clarity as to force us to recognize its existence.
We are not allowed to remain with a simplified (if pleasant) 
view. The tragic involvement of man in Evil is isolated and 
revealed. Tragic man takes sides in the battle against Evil 
but finds himself in the impossible position of functioning 
as both opponent and ally. This was sometime a paradox, as 
Hamlet says, but Tragedy gives it proof.^
Thus we can see the inevitability of the hero's 
defeat. He may attempt to solve Evil (as a problem) or to 
eradicate it (as a disease), but he will always be defeated 
in the attempt, for he cannot change what is a part of the 
given— the Mortal Condition. Because of the paradoxical 
Mortal Condition, even when he is standing against necessity 
he is more firmly establishing that necessity; while seeking 
Justice (or attacking Evil) he is becoming involved in both 
Evil and injustice. He tackles Evil as a problem; but 
Tragedy shows that, as Richmond Hathorn says, Evil is a 
mystery which can never be "solved" like a problem or a
^It is essential to see that, when we speak of the 
tragic figure's paradoxical situation, the one thing we are 
not describing is a psychological conflict of passion and 
reason, as in a kind of psychomachy. To view man's problem 
in these terms is to miss Tragedy, as is the other and 
opposing extreme view--that man is crushed by a force without.
19
riddle.^ It can only be identified, confronted, and experi- 
enced--and perhaps partially understood. The tragic figure 
must and will be crushed. As George Steiner puts it, "The 
tragic personage is broken by forces which can neither be 
fully understood nor overcome by rational prudence. This 
. . .  is crucial. Where the causes of disaster are temporal, 
where the conflict can be resolved through technical or 
social means, we may have serious drama but not tragedy."^
Or as he has finely said later on, "In tragedy, the twist of 
the net which brings down the hero may be an accident or 
hazard of circumstance, but the mesh is woven into the 
heart of l i f e .
The tragic hero must, of course, be self-conscious 
and self-willed, and therefore feel responsible for his 
actions. And when he faces the "problem" of Evil, he must 
have confidence in his ability to solve it. But in Tragedy 
the Mortal Condition is shown to be such that he can never 
achieve either this objectivity or this surety. He must 
choose and act; he will err and fall.
These matters all belong to the finite. But even 
while he must confront Evil as irreducible and ineluctable, 
the tragic figure must at the same time affirm Justice and
1(
'Op. c i t . , p. 8, 
^I b i d . , p. 128.
•O p . c i t . , pp. 16 ff.
2 ,
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Good in the same terras. He is, therefore, brought face to 
face with the mingling of the finite and the infinite.^ 
Tragedy emphasizes that because of the Mortal Condition man 
cannot escape these antinomies. He cannot separate the 
apparent human meaning of his plight and actions from the 
possible divine one. Nor can he deny either. He cannot, in 
short, effect a complete separation of himself and the world. 
Tragedy presents an uneasy balance of the self-conscious and 
the participating mind, one which is of necessity uncertain 
of its judgments, convictions, values, but equally certain 
that it must affirm them.
Thus Tragedy lets us, the mortal viewers, see that 
man is involved in his world, in its Evil, and that he is, 
therefore, incapable of viewing the world simply objectively, 
of standing above it or apart from it. It shows that, as a 
concomitant of this existential involvement, the issues can 
never, for the individual, be clear-cut--Good or Evil, truth 
or falsity, just or_ unjust; that the individual must always 
be to some extent uncertain of the import of his actions 
and even of his motives; that yet he must act and feel h i m ­
self responsible for his actions, even when he finds it
^On this point compare Clifford Leech: "Now it is 
of course true that the tragic writer is concerned with the 
here and now, that any ideas he may have about the co nt inu ­
ance of human life, in another mode, after death, are, for 
the purposes of tragic writing, irrelevant. Nevertheless, 
he sees his characters against a background of cosmic forces, 
unknowable but inviting speculation, unseen yet ever active" 
(The John Fletcher Plays [London: Chatto and Hindus, 1962],
p. llTT7“
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impossible to draw sharp distinctions between what he freely 
chooses and what he could not but choose, between what is 
simply human and what divine, between what he can fully 
understand and what he can see but dimly. This is the u n ­
happy and disturbing feature of the Mortal Condition which 
the tragic writer perceives (or presents) and which the 
tragic figure must confront.
But while it preserves the compelling and disturbing 
nature of man's mortal experience, with all its pathos, 
suffering, and mystery, true Tragedy is also spiritually 
ennobling and pleasing. We are made glad, even in the face 
of the oppressive features of the Mortal Condition revealed 
to us, that we are, like the defeated hero, man. There is 
an ennobling appeal in the hero's struggle against the in­
vincible power of his own condition. Indeed, his greatness 
is inseparably tied to his defeat. He is great because he 
rises above his mortal condition, even though such a triumph 
can only result in his destruction. Here is the crucial 
paradox of Tragedy, and it is Tragedy's very life. In the 
profoundest sense the hero is both vanquisher and vanquished. 
Thus we admire him. We discover in him, perhaps, the gran­
deur d'ame of which Raphael speaks. And we can agree with 
Raphael that his fall is elevating for us, that spiritually 
he is triumphant although physically vanquished. In his 
destruction we recognize the inseparability of his tragedy 
and his triumph, and we are at once grieved and made proud
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in our humanity.
The paradox of his tragedy is more real, however, 
than Raphael sees. We are only partially correct when we 
say that he is spiritually greater than the adversary which 
defeats him. In a sense, to be sure, he is. He does become 
greater than he is. But this is the central point; he b e ­
comes greater than ^  is, not greater than God, or Nature, 
or Fate, or some such external force. The force is at once 
external and internal, personal and impersonal, human and 
divine.
This distinction is very helpful when we come to 
consider a question that has troubled most students of 
Tragedy: can Tragedy be Christian? Most recent critics
have answered no.^ Since all Tragedy, most of them have 
said, depends on wasted goodness, it cannot be Christian, 
for Christianity does not allow that goodness can be wasted-- 
not in the ultimate meaning of the world, which is known 
only to God. Moreover, they claim, the exaltation of man 
to a sublimity surpassing that of his adversary, which, for 
the Christian, must finally be identified with God, is 
impious and blasphemous, and in no way amenable to Christian 
doctrine. Thus it has often been supposed that Tragedy 
must be essentially Manichaean or at best agnostic, that it
^For instance A. C. Bradley, I. A. Richards, Una 
E l l i s- Fe rmor, Karl Jaspers, D. D. Raphael, R. B. Sewall.
Cf. Raphael, op. c i t . , pp. 40 ff.
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is firmly grounded in a serious question whether there be 
a just order in the universe which impinges on the life of 
man, and that the answer of the writer of Tragedy is most 
often no. These arguments are serious and often persuasive, 
though, I am convinced, wrong. And they need to be examined 
closely not only because they are sometimes made the basis 
for unfruitful theories about the kind of age in which 
Tragedy can be written, but also because they distort what 
a Tragedy actually does.
There are two principal objections to these argu ­
ments. First, they assume that the "questioning" which 
follows the recognition of Evil in the world is the poet's, 
not the tragic figure's; the question "What meaneth Nature 
by these diuerse Lawes?" is then the poet's as he functions 
as philosopher. And since the agreement is that purest 
Tragedy presents man being crushed, then the poet must b e ­
lieve either in a Manichaean struggle between Good and Evil, 
or in a criminal God. But though the poet has no doubt 
questioned as man, as poet he is not himself asking the ques­
tion but presenting tragic man asking. He is not, in this 
sense, functioning as philosopher. He is, rather, d is­
covering to man the essence of what it means, to experiencing 
man, to be mortal. He shows to man the nature of the Mortal 
Condition that he is in as he discovers and confronts Evil.
He reveals the Mortal Condition from the point of view, not 
of the truly omniscient observer, but of man involved in his
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world, in its Evil, of man who looks before and after, who 
is both spiritual and physical. Tragedy does not assert 
that, because man cannot discern a conservation of goodness 
in the world, it is not there. It is not a product of black 
pessimism, because in itself it does not confuse the human 
and immortal views of the order of the universe.
Tragedy reveals the meaning of mortality. It does 
not stop short with the single-voiced "lament or melancholy 
l y r i c , b u t  attempts to demonstrate the fullness of the 
mystery of Evil in the world. Through the confrontation 
with the Mortal Condition the tragic figure learns more of 
what it means to be mortal. We, of course, learn even more 
accurately what it means, because for a time we are freed, 
through the power of art, from the mortal limitations and 
see the play whole (including the elevating spirit of the 
tragic figure), whereas he, being a part of it, can never 
grasp it entire.
But the writer of Tragedy functions, not as the
2
answerer, but as the identifier and poser of questions. He 
reveals the meaning of the Mortal Condition, not the meaning 
of life. He does not avoid or underplay the suffering and 
misery of man's life, but he does show that man can be noble 
and exalting in this condition. He says that life can be
^Richard Sewall, op_. c i t . , p. 5.
^Raphael makes a similar point.
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Tragedy to the unflinching human view, not that this is The 
Meaning of Life,
Clearly, if God were to write the play, there would 
be no Tragedy. But this is not the play of which God is the 
author. This is a play written from the point of view of 
man, perhaps even a Christian man. Theodicies are written 
from the point of view of God,^ and even should one accept 
their theological argument without question, when he turns 
to look at the life of man as man, subject to the Mortal 
Condition, then he finds it liable to Tragedy. It is unlike­
ly that any but the most extraordinary minds, those capable 
of crying out with joy as they are put to the stake, can sus­
tain the immortal point of view. Perhaps the poet is capable 
of it for the duration of a composition (it is possible that 
tragi-comedies are written from approximations of this point
^I choose the term theodicy here because, since in 
its strictest sense the term refers to a justification of the 
existence of Evil in the world, particularly a world created 
by God, this keeps the attention on the fundamental intention 
of the work in question: to see the true meaning and purpose
of the world. Obviously such an attempt must presume to see 
the world from a vantage other than that employed by man. In 
the celebrated Theodi cy of Leibniz, for instance, the primary 
thesis is that what man experiences as evil must not be ele­
vated to the plane of final being, because to do so is to 
confute the infinite with the finite. Man's judgment is 
always limited by inherent ignorance: it does not penetrate
to teleology. The purpose and meaning of the world are known 
only to God. In a sense, of course, this is a human solu­
tion, but only in a limited sense. Ultimately it argues that 
there is no human solution. Thus the point of view of God is 
postulated, even if it is postulated negatively; that is, by 
the necessity for that point of view through a recognition of 
the inadequacy of the human point of view to solve the pr ob ­
lem, or answer the question.
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of view). But man is mortal, and for the vast majority of 
men there will exist an inevitable tension between religious 
hope-religious experience, and mortal experience. Indeed, 
this too is a part of the Mortal Condition which tragic man 
faces. The writer of Tragedy preserves this tension as well 
as the ambiguity and renders it in his drama. He refuses to 
oversimplify by choosing, just as man is unable to choose in 
his ordinary experience of the world.
Abstractions about the incompatibility of this view
and optimistic religion simply fail to see that these are 
inseparable rival claims on man's mortality. This confusion 
is similar to that of Theodore Spencer in Death and Elizabe­
than Tragedy when he finds the popularity of the memento
mori of the middle ages to be an indication that death was
the looked-for end to life, that it was desired and the 
after-life devoutly wished for.^ But surely the reason why 
the memento mori was effective as a means to turning man's 
thoughts away from worldly lust is that it dwells on the
ever-present fear of death in man, the mortal, fleshly horror 
2
of it. It too, then, reveals the paradox, the mystery of 
the Mortal Condition.
^Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936.
2
Herbert J. Muller makes the same point; "Their 
[Medieval men's] lust for life led to a horror of death u n ­
paralleled in all history . . . .  The horror was due in part 
to the fear of hell, but mostly it seemed due to the thought 
of mortality, the melting of this not too solid flesh" (The 
Spirit of Tragedy [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956],
p. 139).
27
The second objection to the arguments about the i n ­
compatibility of Christianity and Tragedy is partially c on­
sequent on the first. Since in Tragedy the poet is not a t ­
tempting to give a statement of the ultimate meaning of the 
world or man's experience in it, since he is writing neither 
theodicy nor manifesto of pessimism, we cannot conclude that 
he is impiously exalting man over God. Moreover, as has 
been pointed out, man becomes greater than himself, not 
greater than God. The greatness he achieves, his nobility, 
is essentially inseparable from his mortality, his not being 
greater than God. Thus without going into the question "how 
pessimistic is Christianity?" (an answer to which might tend 
to resolve the problem in another way) we can conclude that 
Tragedy is not in itself anti-Christian.
We do not mean by Tragedy, then, all serious drama.
We mean a literary creation that takes its root in catas­
trophe, in human defeat and suffering; and which, by focusing 
on and revealing the Mortal Condition, causes us to expe ri ­
ence the paradoxical union of opposites in man, as he con­
fronts Evil in the worl'd. And it is a piece of literature 
that raises equally paradoxical emotions in us--syrapathy (or 
pity) and spiritual elevation: a joyful sorrow. But the
joy does not come with victory, or with the aversion of 
catastrophe. On the contrary, it comes with defeat (from 
which rises a "tragic" victory) and from catastrophe itself. 
Thus we do not speak of Tragedies with "happy endings," for
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this is to deny Tragedy.
It is at this point that we come once again to the 
question of what Aristotle means by For although
he clearly means basically the same as we when he speaks of 
the best Tragedy as ending in catastrophe and when he chooses 
Oedipus Tyrannus as an example of it, he is not meaning the 
same as we when he describes the best tragic incident and 
speaks for an avoiding of the catastrophe. Nor can I agree 
with Professor Cooper when he says that the contradiction in 
Aristotle is not a serious one.^ Surely it is a crucial one, 
one which causes us to doubt whether Aristotle means anything 
so limited as we do today when we say Tragedy. It appears to 
be prima facie evidence that Aristotle might be speaking of 
two somewhat different matters in the two passages, or ot he r­
wise speaking in both instances of a much more vaguely de­
fined concept than we, one so broad as to accommodate both 
types without contradiction. Thus Else's statement about the 
meaning of Tpt.^ Aristotle must be taken seriously.^
But whether it is possible to decide what Aristotle means by
t we are here trying to discover what we mean. And 
we do not mean what Aristotle seems at times to mean.
On the other hand, pity for the sufferings of the 
tragic figure, who is brought close to all men by the oneness
^Lane Cooper, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry ; An 
Amplified Version With Supplementary Illustrations (rev, e d . ; 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947), p p . 46-47.
2
See Chapter I, p. 11 »
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of their plight, is surely a result of Tragedy. To this 
extent one must agree with Aristotle. But that to raise 
pity is the telos of Tragedy is a difficult conclusion to 
accept. Certainly I do not here wish to define the end or 
purpose of Tragedy in any final sense. I strongly doubt 
the possibility of one's doing so. But the end of Tragedy 
appears to be equally the full revelation of the meaning of 
the Mortal Condition, a necessary consequence of which, no 
doubt, is the excitement of pity.
So it is with fear. Perhaps Tragedy does cause one 
to experience fear, because of the certain recognition that 
one is by nature subject to the same kind of suffering as 
the tragic personage. But if so it would appear to be a 
different kind of fear from what is often supposed by students 
of Aristotle. Surely it is not fear that, unless one changes 
one's ways, one too will suffer. For Tragedy, as we have 
seen, is not, in its essence, moral exhortation.
Nowhere, moreover, does Aristotle account for the 
feeling (emotion?) of elevation that we gain from Tragedy.
Yet this is an undoubted experience, and an essential one. 
Furthermore, it is one which is accounted for by the nature 
of the Mortal Condition. And it is an understanding of this 
concept that enables us to see what Tragedy which is our
object.
And what of h a m a r t i a ? Clearly the involvement of 
man in Evil, his sharing of guilt, is postulated by the
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Mortal Condition. He is both guilty and innocent. In a 
sense, to be sure, he possesses a "tragic flaw," but it is 
the flaw shared by all mankind, the flaw of mortality. It 
is not, therefore, of itself a distinguishing feature of the 
tragic figure, except that in him we see the nature of the 
flaw more clearly than we do ordinarily in ourselves.
Moreover, this involvement of tragic man in no wise 
sets him apart from the wholly good man, unless by the 
wholly good man we mean an ideal man who cannot and does not 
exist; for the Mortal Condition as shown by Tragedy is shared 
and faced by all men, by virtue of their being men. Thus 
among real men no such creature as the wholly good man can 
be found, and could not be accepted or believed if drawn.
Thus I can find no real meaning to the suggestion that his 
sufferings would bring not pity but moral revulsion.
And yet we do, apparently, ask that the tragic hero 
be a "good" man. And here one finds Else's explanation of 
Aristotle helpful.^ By "good" man we seem to mean the man 
who strives for virtue, for good, for right, rather than the 
man who spends his life simply making money or seeking 
pleasure, or both. This kind of man, we agree, is worthy of 
being taken seriously, for he is serious and his life is 
serious. He is a good man, though as man he can never be 
simply good,
^See Chapter I, p. 10.
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One cannot help wishing, however, to find more 
application for Aristotle's h a m a r t i a . It seems always to 
hint at a profound awareness of the Mortal Condition. It 
does suggest, I believe, the mysterious intermingling of 
fated and free, of responsibility and no responsibility, of 
human and divine. And there can be no question that hamartia 
in this sense can be found as a cornerstone in the tragic 
conception of the Mortal Condition. In fact, the concept 
hamartia appears to be rather persuasive proof that Aristotle 
perceived (albeit fleetingly, perhaps) the very nature of 
Tragedy. But the insight seems to have been dimmed by its 
immersion in the deeps of the category of serious drama 
called ^  » And this fact does much, I believe, to
explain the difficulty subsequent students of Tragedy have 
had with the term. Finally, furthermore, one arrives to a 
perception of the worth of the term by an independent 
investigation of the nature of Tragedy, and sees its true 
value only after one has found the nature of Tragedy.
CHAPTER III
GREAT TRAGEDY
Oedipus the King 
The myth of Oedipus has been variously explored and 
explained. Freud and his followers have seemed to find in 
it an expression of a universal psychical conflict which is 
experienced in some measure by all men. The Cambridge school 
of anthropologists has very convincingly demonstrated that 
the myth (along with all myths) has its origins in ritual and 
religious observance. And these are no doubt fruitful and 
pertinent studies in man's continuing attempt to understand 
himself. Indeed the latter line of investigation has had an 
enormous and fundamental effect on the modern view of man.
But surely an equally valid, and for us more pertinent, way 
of approaching the myth is to view it as embodiment of man's 
tragic experience. Clearly the Oedipus story as a revelation 
of the mystery of human experience still holds the power to 
interest and affect us. And of the Tragedies of Sophocles 
(the most accessible and vital of the Greek dramatists today), 
Oedipus the King finds the easiest and best audience.
In Sophocles's play we find an employment and adapta­
tion of the myth that focuses on the mystery of Evil and
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renders the mythic (or allegorical) content of the story in 
an objective action that reveals and accentuates the Mortal 
Condition, "Begetter and begotten have long been one," the 
Chorus says of Oedipus when his full plight has been re - 
vealed.^ And such always is tragic man. Like Oedipus, he 
both suffers and performs. Like Oedipus too, he is u l t i ­
mately at the center of the condition which he attempts to 
combat. Since he cannot lift himself by his bootstraps, he 
can nowhere get a purchase on his burden.
As Sophocles employs the myth, it joins with the o b ­
jective vehicle of action in the drama to present a study in 
the development of tragic self-consciousness. As Francis 
Fergusson says,
by starting the play at the end of the story, and showing 
onstage only the last crucial episode in Oedipus' life, 
the past and present action of the protagonist are re­
vealed together; and, in each other's light, are at last 
felt as one, Oedipus' quest for the slayer of Laius b e ­
comes a quest for the hidden reality of his own past; and 
as that slowly comes into focus, like repressed material 
under psychoanalysis--with sensory and emotional i m me di ­
acy, yet in the light of acceptance and understanding-- 
his immediate quest also reaches its end: he comes to
see himself (the Savior of the City) and the guilty one, 
the plague of Thebes, at once and at one, 2
The quest is a journey into self-consciousness of an ind ivi­
dual, the tragic figure, and mythically recapitulates the 
awakening self-consciousness of a race. The encapsulated
^ The Tragedies of S o p ho cl es, trans. Sir Richard C. 
Jebb (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1904), p, 47,
^The Idea of ^  Theater (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday S Company, Inc,, 1954), pp. 29-30,
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time, the coexistence of all times in the mind of the indiv i­
dual, Oedipus, enforces a recognition of Oedipus's im plica­
tion in the guilt, a recognition of the responsible self- 
aware person.
Oedipus, in Oedipus R e x , confronts the dilemmas of p e r ­
sonal commitment as opposed to intellectual abstraction, 
of his own relationship to fate and freedom, of apparent 
existence and true being, of the acceptance or rejection 
of emergent selfhood; he is, in short, faced with the 
prime mysteries of human existence . . . .^
At the outset of the play Oedipus, like the others, 
is still trying to externalize Evil, to set the blame for the 
plague wholly outside, on someone or something else--as he 
has always attempted to do. Heretofore he has apprehended 
Evil as a possibility in the scheme of things, a decree of 
the gods. That he would kill his father and marry his mother, 
acts that violate every sense of right he knows, is a p r e ­
diction and constraint from without, one against which he can 
struggle and which he can hope to overcome. Perhaps, Oedipus 
realizes, there is an inescapable pattern to man's life (he 
fears the truth of the prophecy sufficiently to feel that he 
must oppose it), but perhaps also (indeed, he thinks "surely") 
there is a higher or larger order still, by which his view of 
right and justice can be vindicated. Thus his task is to 
apprehend that higher order or significance and then change 
the scheme of things (the condition of man) to fit it--to 
solve, in short, "the problem." This he attempts to do when
^Hathorn, op. c i t . , p. 82.
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he leaves Corinth in order to circumvent the Oracle (and 
which Laius did when he had Oedipus lamed and exposed).
This he attempts also when he solves the riddle of 
the Sphinx. And although the riddle itself is never stated 
in the play, it is of great importance to the drama as Trage­
dy. And it is always present: it is always present in the
fact of Oe d i p u s ’s reign; it is referred to several times, 
and significantly, in the play itself; and it is present in 
the association of the present plague with the Sphinx's 
terror and Laius's death. Thus one can never forget that 
Oedipus has solved the riddle and been the savior of his 
people, and that somehow his ability to release the Sphinx's 
hold is connected with his present trouble.
Oedipus's plight demonstrates clearly that when one 
gets beyond the superficial features of Evil he finds him ­
self implicated. He cannot remain uninvolved in either the 
weakness or the guilt. Oedipus stood apart when he answered 
the riddle. He viewed man from without and saw that in the 
ordinary course of time he moves on four, then two, and 
finally three legs. To be able objectively to view mankind 
and to observe a part of the pattern of his life is no doubt 
helpful: it frees him from the primitive, dreaming response
to nature that makes all unpredictable. But it removes 
evils, not Evil. It does not make the pattern any less true, 
only more predictable. And it is not an adequate description 
of man: it is an abstraction, an external view, incapable of
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describing what happens to the individual within the riddle, 
where it is not a riddle but a mystery.^
But mythically (and the material of the play ^  
myth), Oedipus's solution of the riddle is a long step in 
the direction of self-consciousness and the consequent in­
ternalization of responsibility. It frees the Thebans from 
the external power that has borne them down and to which they 
have sacrificed their young men. It begins to bring the 
attention away from the gods, and fates, and other external 
forces, and to place it more and more on man himself. How­
ever, this mythic content does not subsist alone, or only in 
the myth: it is the infinitely suggestive symbolic content
of the play's action that advances and reenforces its tragic 
statement. Moreover it is perfectly consonant with the view 
of Sophocles's interest expressed by Werner Jaeger:
The sense of beauty that produced the men and women of 
Sophocles arose from a vast new interest in the souls of 
tragic characters. It was a manifestation of the new 
ideal of arete, which for the first time emphasized the 
central importance of the p s y c h e , the 'soul,' in all 
culture. In the course of the fifth century the word 
psyche acquired a new overtone, a loftier significance, 
which reached its fulness in the teaching of Socrates.
The soul was now objectively recognized as the centre 
of m a n 's l i f e .^
Thus it is easy to see how this feature of the myth could
mystery, Gabriel Marcel says, is "a problem which 
encroaches on its own data" (quoted in Hathorn, 0 £. c i t . ,
pp. 81-82).
2
P a i d e i a : The Ideals of Greek C u l t u r e , trans. G i l ­
bert Highet Ts v o l s . ; New York: Oxford University Press,
1945), I, 279.
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strike the imagination and intuition of Sophocles so that he 
would perceive its essential contribution to the Tragedy of 
Oedipus. For here he sees the mythic embodiment of the 
growing spirituality of man, the emergence of his soul in 
self-consciousness. The increasing self-consciousness of 
Oedipus, the internalizing of Evil so that it emerges, 
finally, as both internal and external, is joined and r e e n ­
forced, therefore, by the mythic revelation of the same p ro ­
cess occurring within the race.^
Just as he must look within the walls of Thebes to 
find the murderer of Laius, so must he look within himself 
to see what man really is, what his implication in the 
general taint must be. He must focus his "m o t h e r - w i t ,” his 
ability to discover the meaning of dark words, on himself if 
he is to understand his adversary. He too will become "a 
little soiled i ' t h ' working." "Whoever regards himself as 
an instrument of justice," Hathorn says, "is apt to be blind 
to the fact that, since 'it is the mover that is m o v e d , ’ 
justice is to be fulfilled on_ him as well as through him." 
Then we discover that his attempt to separate himself from 
the external world when he determined to circumvent the
^Moreover, as Professor Myers has said, "The artist 
in tragedy does not have it [the realization of the tragic 
relation between good and evil] in mind as a conscious goal. 
He experiments until he feels he has achieved a tragic atti ­
tude; nothing else will satisfy him. Although utterly free 
from theory, even although guided by false theory, he may be 
infallible in taste and feeling" (o£. c i t . , p. 9).
^ O p . c i t ., p . 31.
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prophecy was futile. The ability to view the whole scheme 
of things and thereby to see the meaning of his actions 
could not be his. His actions had ramifications far beyond 
what he could foresee or control.
At the same time, we see that the assertion of re­
sponsibility by Oedipus in his struggle against the Oracle, 
an assertion that is based on self-consciousness, is the 
necessary prerequisite for solving the riddle, for it e n ­
ables him to view man with a degree of objectivity, to see 
him as in some ways an atemporal spirit and as one who is 
not simply bound down by outside forces. Moreover, this 
arrogation of responsibility to himself is at the heart of 
both his guilt and his grandeur. He would hardly admire him 
(though we might pity him) if he absolved himself entirely 
of responsibility and made of himself a total cipher whose 
actions are determined wholly from without (as behavioral 
psychologists would have us view man). And it is not enough 
to say that he should not presume to see the world's meaning 
and to pursue an ideal of right action that is contrary to 
the scheme of things as it is apprehended by him. One can 
say that he is guilty of h y b r i s , but he must also say that 
either Oedipus resists or he acquiesces in an action that 
goes entirely counter to his sense of right. The myth 
allows for no evasion; this dilemma, the mortal dilemma, 
must be faced. Furthermore, although it is possible to argue 
that to the Greeks this hybris was Oedipus's cardinal sin.
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this does nothing to explain the power of this play on a 
modern audience. For even if we know intellectually that 
hybris was to the Greeks a sin, to us it is not--at least 
not in the same sense. And even more importantly, this view 
of Oedipus's guilt ignores entirely the central dramatic and 
symbolic concern of Sophocles's play.
Oedipus, through the entire action of the play, is 
involved in an attempt to isolate and remove Evil, just as 
in his actions on leaving Corinth he was attempting to evade 
it. And the latter is what the Thebans have wished to do. 
Most men, of course, simply struggle against the external 
features of the Mortal Condition. They are involved in it 
no less than the tragic figure, but they are usually not put 
into the situation of having to look on it bare. Their con­
cern is with the immediate evils--the plague or the riddle.
At the beginning of Sophocles's play, the Thebans do not d e ­
sire, as they did not when Oedipus saved them from the riddle 
of the Sphinx, to penetrate the mystery. They wish d eli ve r­
ance from the present suffering, not deliverance from Evil.
As they inform Oedipus, they were unable, when Laius was 
killed, to address themselves to the central problem of his 
death, for the Sphinx was upon them.
But Oedipus, the mythical embodiment of tragic man, 
must attempt to pierce to the heart of things, to find the 
ultimate solution of the "problem," to win a final judgment 
of victory. Evasion is no longer possible--not in Tragedy.
<+0
In a sense he is truly the Thebans' scapegoat. He solves 
their problem when he first arrives in Thebes, and he it is 
who must free them once more. He it is who must learn that 
to do away with one plague is to make room for another, until 
one finally comes up against the impenetrable barrier of the 
Mortal Condition. Though, in their absorption with the 
individual deaths that have been brought to them by the 
plague, the Thebans have not known it, Death (the death of 
the king) is still a present fact. Thus, although they ig­
nore the heart of the problem, unaware of its meaning, what 
they are in effect asking is the elimination of the condition 
of mortal man, its major feature, Death. And so the Oracle 
informs them. Through Death Oedipus seemingly brought them 
freedom from their ills. "He arose from our land like a 
tower against Death . . . . But he was in the mortal con­
dition when he came to them, and their problem is that Mortal 
Condition. The freedom was temporary and illusory, as Oedi­
pus must learn. "Enough, methinks, enough--when our land is
2
already vexed--that the matter should rest where it ceased," 
the Chorus says to Jocasta when she asks the matte r of the 
quarrel between Oedipus and Creon. But of course the matter 
has not ceased; it has hardly begun. The Evil will not stay 
outside. A hearkening to practical wisdom is not permitted
^Sophocles, l o c . c i t .
^Ibid. , p. 28.
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to the tragic figure. He cannot simply accept the presence 
of Evil and resolve prudently to keep it at bay. He must 
make the grand assault. Oedipus must yet reveal to us 
through his actions and situation that in order to stamp out 
Evil one must stamp out man himself.
It is of course fruitless to question whether Oedi­
pus acted from truly f r e e  choice or supernatural compulsion. 
Sophocles does not choose between them. He presents it as 
a mystery. Whether man does in fact have free will is a 
fascinating question, but it is an excursus into metaphysics 
that leads one outside the Tragedy. It would be better to 
remember this statement by Jaeger:
The irrationality of Ate had puzzled Solon and exercised 
the minds of all serious thinkers of that age, but for 
Sophocles it is the basis, not the central problem, of 
tragedy. Aeschylus had tried to solve the problem of 
Ate: Sophocles admits its insolubility as a fact. Yet
he does not passively accept the unavoidable suffering 
sent by God, which Greek poets had from the earliest 
times lamented; and he has no sympathy whatever for the 
resignation of Simonides, who concluded that man must 
forfeit his Arete when cast down by inescapable m i s ­
fortune. By making his tragic characters greatest and 
noblest of mankind, Sophocles cries Yes to the fateful 
question which no mortal mind can solve. His characters 
are the first who, by suffering the absolute abandonment 
of their earthly happiness or of their social and physi­
cal life, reach the truest greatness attainable by man.l
Oedipus himself continues, after the discovery of 
his guilt, to affirm his responsibility (free will) and his 
commitment to an ideal of Justice. He puts out his eyes and 
carries out the full sentence he has pronounced. Despite
lpp. c i t . , I , 283.
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his attempts to avoid the horror of it, the prophecy was 
realized, both through and against him. The external and 
internal, finite and infinite come together. It was Apollo 
who caused him to put out his eyes, he says. "Apollo, 
friends, Apollo was he that brought these my woes to pass, 
these my sore, sore woes: but the hand that struck the eyes
was none save mine, wretched that I a m . The mystery re­
mains: both fated and free is Oedipus. But to the end he
declares that he is the responsible agent of Justice. He is 
powerless to alter the Mortal Condition, but he is noble in
his assault on it. "Make that my reproach," Oedipus says
2
to Tiresias, "in which thou shalt find me great." And in 
fact that which made him great at once brings about his 
downfall and makes him noble and inspiring. Even in defeat 
he proclaims his right and power to judge and punish himself. 
And even though this is an example of h y b r i s , a taking on 
himself of the prerogatives of the gods, it is nonetheless 
a feature of his nobility and a further indication of the 
dilemma of man--man who must declare himself capable of 
judging even in the face of all evidence to the contrary. 
There is still an affirmation, as there is in the purest 
Tragedy, of Justice and of man's ability to know it. The 
play reveals "that a human being stands as a finitude in the
^Sophocles, op. c i t ., pp. 51-52.
^Ibid. , p. 19.
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midst of an infinite cosmos and that with this infinity he 
has simultaneous relations of conjunction and disconti nu­
ity."^ It shows that the answer to the riddle "What is 
man?" cannot finally be known by man within. The answer to 
the Sphinx's riddle is not adequate. Neither is Oedipus's 
belief that he is the final arbiter of his fate and d e t e r ­
miner of its meaning. He shows that the suffering of man 
happens both to and through him. "It is the mover that is 
m o v e d ."
Tragedy is not a lesson in humility or in how better 
to conduct oneself lest one make the same mistakes. The 
Chorus in Greek Tragedy often suggests otherwise, but of 
course the Chorus is not privy to the meaning of the whole 
play. Its members are mortal and therefore caught in the 
net, and they are generally still persisting in the human 
desire to avert Evil, an external Evil. But it was not a 
mistake, a hazard of circumstance, that brought the tragedy, 
but the Mortal Condition itself. The mystery is affirmed. 
There is at once humility and exaltation. "To know oneself 
is . . . for Sophocles to know man's powerlessness; but it
is also to know the indestructible and conquering majesty of 
suffering h u m a n i t y . M a n  is shown affirming his re sp onsi­
bility and dignity, championing Good and Justice, even while
^Hathorn, o£. c i t . , p. 29.
^Jaeger, op. cit. , I, 284.
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he defeats himself. And Oedipus the King is the great 
Tragedy it is, not so much because it does this better than 
other Tragedies, but because it does it with an almost a b s o ­
lute condensation and concentration.
Antigone
The Antigone of Sophocles presents an interesting 
and somewhat singular exploration of the tragedy of man's 
situation. Here one finds two principal tragic figures 
(Antigone and Creon) and a less prominent but nonetheless 
real third one (Haemon). It is true that in Oedipus the 
King Jocasta cannot be dismissed as a tragic personage; she 
has been in the past and is in the present of the play h e r ­
self involved in the Evil and shares somewhat the guilt. Of 
course even in such great Tragedies as Hamlet and Othello 
there is some proliferation of the tragedy among other p e r ­
sons than the two principals. But in Hamlet the effect of 
this fragmentation is extremely slight: Hamlet is himself
the tragic center, even more than Oedipus is in Oedipus the 
K i n g , and clearly the action of Oedipus is the definer of 
the Tragedy. In Othello the tragic theme is carried by 
Othello's trials and actions, not by Desdemona's. In An ti­
gone , however, both Creon and Antigone are sufferers of a 
tragic fall, and the central revelation of the nature of the 
Tragedy is achieved through the parallel and complementary 
positions of these two figures.
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The basic conflict in Antigone is, of course, b e ­
tween the laws of the state and man (Creon) and the laws of 
Heaven and the Gods (Antigone). Antigone insists that no 
laws of man contrary to those of Heaven can be just or 
binding. Creon equally adamantly refuses to accept any in­
fringement on the laws of the state. The clash that comes 
from this opposition appears, thus, to be one between the 
kingdom of Caesar and the kingdom of God. And certainly 
Antigone appeals to the kingdom of God for approbation of 
her deeds. "One world approved thy wisdom," she says to 
Ismene when the latter refuses to join her in burying Poly- 
neices; "another, m i n e .
But the more crucial theme of this conflict is the 
dilemma that tragic man finds himself in when he judges, when 
he seeks to unite the finite and the infinite, right and 
Right. Creon thinks, as firmly as does Antigone, that his 
proclamations have final sanction in Right and Justice. He 
is as certain as she that Justice is on his side. And each 
thinks the other a source of Evil. But the play shows there 
is (and can be) no final certainty that either is right.
All that one can be certain of is that this feeling of c e r t i ­
tude brings with it unhappiness and destruction. In the play 
as a whole there is strong accentuation of the finitude of 
"judgment." And from this finitude comes a restatement of
^Sophocles, op. cit., p. 145.
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the questions: Does the mortal law agree with the immortal?
Can one judge?
It would be easy to derive from this conflict be­
tween temporal and eternal allegiances a trivial and tire­
some reduction to a conflict between love and duty (as Dryden 
and Lee have shown). And if the conflict were such a simple 
and clearly-defined one, the tragedy would have been sti ll ­
born; for then Antigone, the tragic figure, would have been 
contending with social problems, laws that could be revoked 
so as to set matters aright. However, what emerges most 
clearly from this play is the inscrutability of man's pre di ­
cament. "Alas!" the guard says to Creon, "'Tis sad, truly, 
that he who judges should misjudge."^ And his words are far 
truer than he can know. For what he says is true, and 
equally true, Sophocles lets us see, is the fact that finite 
man must always be liable to such mis judgment, and uncertain.
Both Creon and Antigone externalize Evil. Antigone 
places it in the decrees of Creon; and he posits it in the 
disobedience of Antigone (and Haemon). But from the ca t a s ­
trophes that follow on the actions of these two, one can see 
that they must share the guilt. Creon's guilt is more 
strongly shown, of course. It is greatly emphasized by 
Tiresias's prophecy (in a scene strikingly parallel to the 
Oedipus-Tiresias scene in Oedipus the K i n g ) and by the
^Ibid. . p. 137.
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suicides of Haemon and Eurydice. However, since there can 
be no assurance that Antigone's course of action was in fact 
the correct one, she must share in the guilt. Both Creon 
and Antigone insist on their right and capacity to see things 
clearly: both are responsible and self-conscious. And yet
the mystery of Evil, the inscrutability of man's predicament,
is all that is seen.
Here the Oedipus myth enters once again, breaking 
through to the present from its eternal presence in the b a c k ­
ground of the events of the play. "But in this ordeal thou
art paying, haply, for thy father's sin," the Chorus says to 
Antigone after her sentence to death; and she answers "Thou 
hast touched on my bitterest thoughts--awakening the ever- 
new lament for my sire and for all the doom given to us, the 
famed house of Labdacus."^ We cannot forget that Antigone 
(and Polyneices and Eteocles) is descended from Laius and 
Oedipus. And here we are reminded that the sins of the 
fathers are visited on their children. This point of the 
myth illuminates Antigone's situation, and Creon's as well. 
The passing of guilt down through successive generations 
follows easily from the basic tragic content of the myth.
From the time when Laius first began to set himself against 
the gods as external, compelling forces; from the time, in 
other words, when he took responsibility for judging Right
^Ibid. , pp. 155-156.
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and Justice (and thereby judging the gods), when he would no 
longer passively accept Evil as an unchangeable imposition 
of the gods on man--from that time forward, man (the children 
of Laius and their children) could no longer be free of 
guilt, for from that time forward he could and must presume 
to judge. Here we find the soul of man declared a blend of 
mortal and immortal. Indeed, when Antigone is being led away 
she makes an explicit comparison between herself and a 
g o d d e s s .
But with this view of man's spirit, and the dignity 
and responsibility it carries with it, comes the curse of 
guilt. It precludes the continued externalizing of Evil. 
"Nothing that is vast enters into the life of mortals without 
a c u r s e . I t  is at once the glory of man and the begetter 
of h y b r i s , his sin.
Thus the Evil which Antigone resists is not merely 
social or institutional; it is woven into the very nature of 
man's existence. Her own situation seems to suggest more 
strongly than Creon's the mysterious and indefinable relation 
between mortal and immortal. And like Creon she is defeated 
by herself.
A n t i g o n e , though it brings the tragic recognition, 
does not have quite the tragic intensity of Oedipus the K i n g , 
because of the fragmentation of the tragic sense and situation
^Ibid. , p. 148.
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between Creon and Antigone. The spiritual elevation comes 
from Antigone. In her we see the nobility of o n e ’s resolve 
in the face of destruction, whereas the suffering of Creon, 
on which the play closes and makes its final comment, leads 
more to a note of sadness only.^ On the other hand, the 
discovery of Evil as both external and internal is made 
mostly through Creon. It is necessary, therefore, to, in a 
sense, see Creon and Antigone as complementary halves of the 
tragic figure, and this somewhat weakens the effect. But 
nonetheless, the tragic nature of the Mortal Condition is 
fully realized in A n t i g o n e , and one experiences the power of 
Tragedy through it.
Hamlet
The Tragedy of Hamlet too focuses on the Mortal Con­
dition. It is not so sharp a focus as that of Oedipus the 
King: there is a certain amount of looseness and diffusion
in this play that one does not find in Oedipus the King ; and 
the "story" of Hamlet does not so perfectly and essentially 
reveal the meaning of the Mortal Condition: it lacks the
myth's exactitude of paradox. But the center of the Tragedy 
is the same. Hamlet too is brought face to face with the 
Mortal Condition so that he finds himself, the instrument
^But Creon's sufferings are great indeed. He has 
begun to see his guilt, and this recognition makes his suf­
fering all the more unbearable. Moreover, like Oedipus, he 
understands just enough to intensify his sorrow, but not 
enough to alleviate it. He recognizes his guilt, but the 
Mortal Condition still remains inscrutable to him.
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of revenge and Justice, involved in, in Maynard Mack's words, 
"the general taint.
The play moves from Hamlet's "initiation" into the 
world of the Mortal Condition, to the full recognition of 
what that condition is. When he first appears, Hamlet is an 
embittered and disillusioned young man, who stands apart from 
and above the world in his revulsion, and doubts the exist­
ence of any absolute values or spiritual significance to man's 
life. What has seemed to him a garden in which the con­
trolling hand of Justice and Virtue could be seen and even 
partially supplied by man is now conceived by him to be a 
world of decay and corruption, lust and bestiality, injustice 
and evil.
Because of his mother's hasty and incestuous marriage 
(and the general revelling which marked its acceptance), his 
entire conception of mankind is blackened. His mother had 
seemed to him pure and virtuous and good; yet he can now only 
conclude that she is not. She had seemed to love his father;
but she did not. She is, in fact, to Hamlet the picture of
l u s t .
You cannot call it love, for at your age
The hey-day in the blood is tame, it's humble.
And waits upon the judgement, and what judgement
^"The World of Hamlet," Shakespeare ; Modern Essays 
in C r i t i c i s m , ed. Leonard F. Dean (New York: Oxford Unive r­
sity Press, 1957), p. 252. Although I draw quite different 
conclusions about the Tragedy of Hamlet from those of Mack,
I am very indebted to his brilliant and incisive essay.
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Would step from this to this?^
But hers is worse than bestial lust, for a beast that lacks 
reason would have waited longer before mating again. More ­
over, she is to Hamlet the epitome of mankind; lustful, 
base, and carnal.
It has never seemed difficult to Hamlet to d i stin­
guish the good from the bad or the beautiful from the ugly. 
That his father was better, in every sense, than Claudius has 
seemed to Hamlet as certain as that Good is not Evil. And of 
this latter he has had no doubts. He has believed that man 
is a spiritual creature as well as a carnal, and that his 
spiritual nature rules him and leads him to a recognition 
and embracing of eternal values. But all around himself he 
finds evidence of the ascendancy of the body and its lusts. 
All appears the opposite of what it was. Foul is accounted 
fair (Claudius is taken by his mother to be a fitting re­
placement for his father), evil is proclaimed good (a usurper
takes the throne with general accord), and the death of the 
noble is received with rejoicing (the funeral of his father 
is capped with a wedding celebration by the dead man's 
wife). Thus he can say.
Would I had met my dearest foe in heaven
Or ever I had seen that day, Horat io--.2
For not even that seemingly impossible event could more have
^Shakespeare, op. cit., III.iv.58 ff. All quota­
tions from the play are from this edition.
2l.ii.182 f.
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upset his view of the world. Thus Hamlet begins to suspect
all appearances, all seeming. Everything is deceptive,
especially beauty. What seems beautiful is so only on the
surface, covering the essential canker. It is a false show
that leads one away from the truth:
. . . The power of beauty will sooner transform honesty
from what it is to a bawd, than the force of honesty can 
translate beauty into his likeness. This was sometime a 
paradox, but now the time gives it proof.i
And tjie tendency to dissemble is an innate bent, especially
apparent in women.
I have heard of your paintings too, well enough. God 
hath given you one face and you make yourselves another, 
you jig, you amble, and you lisp, you nickname God's 
creatures, and make your wantonness your ignorance; go 
to. I'll no more on't, it hath made me m a d . 2
This is the attitude that prompts Hamlet's rejection of 
Ophelia. She is not beautiful and pure but only seems so, 
and besides, this is a world of sinners. And this is the 
attitude that sends him to her chamber to gaze with bewilder­
ment (and sadness) on her apparent beauty and purity. The 
spirituality that man has seemed to possess does not exist.
He is at base finally a beast. Hamlet's conclusion, then, 
is that man is only flesh, and therefore carrion. The world 
is devoid of meaning. It consists of putrefaction and the 
generation of maggots from a decaying carcass. Even Ophelia 
is a carrion from whom maggots might spring if she should
^Ill.i.lll ff.
2lII.i.l45 ff.
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stay in the sun of the world. All of life is an endless 
round of this generation and decay, the world a vast grav e­
yard for the flesh and bones of rotten and rotting man.
Thus Hamlet is confronted with the Evil of the world. 
And this Evil has two aspects: there is the evil nature of
man as Hamlet discovers it, and there is also the murder of 
his father. But they become increasingly and inseparably 
one, the Evil which he wishes to stand against. His desire 
is to revenge murder and achieve justice and also overcome 
the baseness of man: to redeem his mother, to punish the
guilty, and to put an end to the generation of base and evil 
man. In short, Hamlet wants to change the world of mortal 
man so that there can be no equivocation, no confusion, no 
dissembling. He wants a world in which Good and Evil are 
clear opposites and in which the former is triumphant. For 
despite his revulsion and dejection Hamlet must continue to 
affirm the existence of the values and ideals by which he 
judges the world and man degenerate.
But throughout this judgment of the world and man 
runs the question "what is man really?" Is it possible that 
he is no more than dust? The graveyard scene reveals Hamlet 
still pondering this question. Can the apparent spirit of 
man be dismissed as inconsequential or nonexistent just b e ­
cause there is no physical residue? This is also perhaps 
the primary meaning of the "to be or not to be" soliloquy.
Is there in fact a spiritual immortality for man? Does his
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life have significance beyond the decay of the body? Is 
there a law by which his acts can be tested and which will 
give meaning to his life? Hamlet is mysterious with q u e s ­
tion, as Maynard Mack has observed.^ And the principal 
effect of the searching questioning is to point up the 
mysteriousness of Evil and of the Mortal Condition.
Hamlet, however, attempts to penetrate the mystery, 
to isolate Evil and destroy it. Throughout four acts of the 
play he tries to find that point outside the drama of life 
from which he can see life clearly and wholly. For he must, 
before he can act, before he can take revenge and achieve 
justice, satisfy himself that Good and Justice do indeed 
exist and that man can judge and proclaim authority. Thus 
Hamlet's delay is simply his continuing struggle to trans­
cend the limited view of man and to look on Justice's face 
uncovered, to know that Evil can be recognized and opposed, 
to verify that his "godlike reason" is godlike indeed.
But what is to act? An act, says the clown, is of
2
three parts: "to act, to do, and to perform." For Hamlet
and the audience, it becomes more and more impossible to d is ­
tinguish among them. Is one what he seems, or does he play 
a role? And when one plays a role, is the role really other 
than what he is? Moreover, does one, when he chooses to do
^ O p . c i t . , p. 252 .
^V.i.ll f.
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something, merely perform a part he did not choose? Where 
is the truth and where one's responsibility? These ques ­
tions the entire play asks, but does not answer.
Yet the self-conscious, responsible individual must 
attempt to answer them. Thus Hamlet steps into the arena 
and "acts." He will become its investigator and judge, and 
Claudius's executioner. He also takes the role of a madman 
to enable him the better to manipulate and observe the whole 
of the action. But once he has taken a "part," he is in­
volved in the Evil and the mystery of it in the world. The 
more he tries to find answers to his questions, the more he 
is involved, and the farther the margin of the unknown recedes 
from him. He functions as the playwright when he alters the 
"mousetrap" play; but this play-within-the-play is the only 
one to which he can be simply audience. This only can he 
see whole. From this must come his judgments of the import 
of the action of which he is a part. He is unable to get 
outside and understand the play in which he finds himself. 
There is no way he can foresee the end of his actions or their 
function. Indeed, he cannot even control the ramifications 
of the "role" he chooses. His feigned madness is involved 
in, to some extent, the deaths of Polonius, Ophelia, Rosen- 
cranz, Gu ild en stern, and Laertes. His determination to see 
justice done is the mainspring of the action that leads him 
ever deeper into the general guilt.
It is true that if one allows his unweeded garden to
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go to seed "things rank and gross in nature"^ will stifle 
the flowers. But since weeds often bloom and flower, it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish them. And when man him­
self is the garden in which grow Good and Evil, is himself
both flower and weed, the simple choice becomes impossible.
Hamlet comes to understand that he is not, even though he
must still attempt to be, free of the ambiguous and mixed
nature of man. "Virtue," he tells Ophelia, "cannot so inocu­
late our old stock, but we shall relish of it . . . ."^ And
a g a i n ,
I am myself indifferent honest, but yet I could accuse 
me of such things, that it were better ray mother had not 
borne me: I am very proud, revengeful, ambitious, with
more offences at my beck, than I have thoughts to put 
them in: what should such fellows as I do crawling b e ­
tween earth and heaven? we are arrant knaves all . . . .^
He was rash and intemperate, he later sees, i.i killing
Polonius and fighting Laertes in Ophelia's grave. He is not
the unblemished man apart. These judgments of himself cause
him not only to question the significance of man's actions
but also to doubt his own motivations. This gives him further
pause.
Hamlet does, of course, come to a kind of personal 
resolution of the problem. Unable to find a key to the 
meaning of the world and its evil, more and more obviously
l%.ii.l36.
^III.i.l77 f.
^III.i.l22 ff.
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caught up in the questions to which he seeks answer, but 
constrained by his very nature to believe that there is 
meaning and purpose to it all, he acknowledges the impossi­
bility of apprehending the meaning of life from the limited 
mortal view and accepts belief in a providential order, in 
"a divinity that shapes our e n d s ,/Rough-hew them how we 
w i l l . Here he would not say "there is nothing either good 
or bad, but thinking makes it so." He is convinced that 
there is both Good and Evil and that one must try to sort 
them out, even though he cannot distinguish clearly. He has 
accepted the mystery. The pattern of life, he now thinks, 
can only be apprehended from a transcendent view, by God.
But we the audience perceive the fullness of the 
Mortal Condition, through his confrontation and clarification 
of it, more comprehensively than he. We are the audience who 
can perceive the wholeness of the drama of which Hamlet is a 
part, the drama which reveals the tragedy of his condition. 
But we, like Hamlet, cannot discover the meaning of the drama 
of life, of which his is the epitome. Shakespeare renders 
the mystery of life. He offers no simplifications of the 
questions through which the play lives. Rather, he directs 
and limits our attention so that we must discover the in­
explicable nature of this Mortal Condition. It is vain to
^V.ii.lO f.
^II.ii.252 f.
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speculate about whether Gertrude is more foolish than evil 
or whether Hamlet is more nearly really mad in one scene than 
in another. The point is that the madness of the world is 
not simple or predictable. Hamlet plays mad, but he is part 
of the madness, at the center of it; and it is also at the 
center of him. When he becomes involved in the "general 
taint," as man must when he "acts" in this world, there is 
no longer any possibility of determining where acting, doing, 
or performing leaves off. What is the limit of one's freedom 
to choose his role? The play weaves this question into the 
mystery and leaves it so. "Or I could make a prologue to my 
brains they had begun the p l a y ."^ One must assume, Shake­
speare seems to say, that there is meaning to a play, that 
all the parts fit the whole, that the entire work can be com­
prehended. And this is the attitude that the tragic figure 
must take toward his world. But Hamlet shows that there are 
plays within plays and that mortal man, both actor and maker, 
player and playwright, finds his roles overlapping and 
breaking the bounds of the action of which he sees them to 
be a part. The "godlike" view and the human view show vague 
and indefinable outlines. Is there in fact a meaning and 
order to life, albeit undiscovered? This too is the mystery.
But the tragedy is that man finds himself in this 
Mortal Condition and must perforce act. Hamlet starts his
^V.ii.30 f.
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action because of a noble dedication to Good and Justice, 
but we see him become immersed in "the destructive element" 
of man. "The mover is moved." His opposition to Evil leads 
inevitably to his guilt and destruction. And Hamlet still 
acts for Justice. Like Oedipus, Hamlet must fail to e x ­
ternalize the world completely, to isolate Evil outside h i m ­
self so that he can identify and fight it. But even with 
the failure he continues to act as though he could. Thus 
he both acts and suffers: he is defeated by the Mortal
Condition .
"What a noble mind is here o 'erthrown ,"^ we echo 
Ophelia. For we know, as we did with Oedipus, that he was 
and is a noble mind. There is no question of the validity 
of Claudius's observations that death is common. And p e r ­
haps there is what we ordinarily think of as worldly wisdom 
in his statement
Why should we in our peevish opposition
Take it to heart? fie, 'tis a fault to heaven,
A fault against the dead, a fault to nature.
To reason most absurd, whose common theme 
Is death of fathers, and who still hath cried.
From the first corse till he that died to-day,
'This must be so.'^
But we know that Hamlet's refusal to thus passively and 
"wisely" accept "the nature of things" is not merely peevi sh­
ness or petulance. His opposing Evil, of which the death of
^III.i.l53.
^I.ii.lOO ff.
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his father is only part, even to the disastrous conclusion, 
is nobler than Claudius's or Polonius's politic acceptance 
of it. Polonius, too, vowed to get to the heart of things, 
but his approach, always on the surface, stops short, as it 
always will, of the sobering discovery of man's involvement, 
enigmatic and terrible, in Evil. Hamlet's nobility makes us 
proud that we are man. The clear revelation of the Mortal 
Condition of man does not cause us to rest in despair and 
sorrow for our lot, but to feel that we can be the greater 
for it. There is no blindly optimistic assurance that the 
aims of God and man are finally one. But there is restrained 
hope that it is so. And there is nobility in Hamlet's stand 
in this position of mystery. He sustains "our belief that 
our finest moments are real and no illusion."^
Othello
The similarities of Hamlet and Othello are many and 
striking. Like Hamlet, Othello, in being brought to a criti­
cal "discovery" of Evil, undergoes disillusionment. He too 
determines to isolate and eradicate this evil. And in the 
process he finds, as do Oedipus, Creon, and Hamlet, that as 
instrument of Justice he is part of the guilt, that he is 
judge and judged, executioner and executed.
But if Hamlet is mysterious with question, Othello 
is uncertain with suspicion. There is not simply Othello's
^William G. McCollom, Tragedy (New York; MacMillan, 
1957), p. 48.
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growing suspicion that Desdemona (and Cassio) is false: 
this particular suspicion is only a part and grows out of 
the general suspicion of mankind that marks lago's approach 
to the world. To lago it is inconceivable that man could 
have any motivations other than total self-interest and lust. 
Man is, to him, a beast with a clever wit, with which he 
manipulates the idealistic values of men as simply counters 
in the game of self-interest that is life. Love "is merely 
a lust of the blood, and a permission of the w i l l . Desde­
mona's "love" for Othello is a craving of the body which 
will soon be satisfied. And "Virtue?" lago does not, like 
Hamlet; believe or hope that there is a correspondence b e ­
tween the tending of the garden and a universal, infinite 
meaning to the garden.
Virtue? a fig! 'tis in ourselves, that we are thus, or 
thus: our bodies are gardens, to the which our wills
are gardeners, so that if we will plant nettles, or sow 
lettuce, set hyssop, and weed up thyme; supply it with 
one gender of herbs, or distract it with many; either to 
have it sterile with idleness, or manur'd with industry, 
why, the power, and corrigible authority of this, lies 
in our will s.2
Man's will and judgment are the sole arbiters, and the values 
man sets are purely relative and human. This is not merely 
an affirmation of the free will of man, but rather a
^The Arden Edition of the Works of William Sh ake­
speare, ed. Una E l l i s - F e r m o r , Othello , ed. M. R. Ridley 
(London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1958), I.iii.335 f. All
quotations from the play are from this edition.
2l.iii.319 ff.
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declaration that it can have no meaning outside itself and 
is therefore an end in itself. Thus man who does not follow 
his own self-interest is a fool. For him there is no such 
thing as Evil. From this judgment comes the view that the 
very epitome of the fair and wise woman is fit only "to 
suckle fools, and chronicle small b e e r . l a g o ,  in fine, 
suspects that all are like him, bestial lust led by a cor­
rupted' will. Thus when he says that he suspects not only 
Othello with his night cap but Cassio as well, the effect 
is to make us think that lago is suspecting not one other 
man, but all men (and women).
The contrast between this view of man and that held 
by Othello cannot be too heavily stressed. We are both told 
and shown that Othello thinks men honest and good. He ac­
cepts men as virtuous. But above all, Othello sees Desde­
mona as the very physical embodiment of Virtue. She is both 
the symbol and real presence of Virtue in the world. There
is no hyperbole in Othello's statement, "If she be false,
2
0, then heaven mocks itself,/I'll not believe it."
Therefore, when Othello begins to succumb to lago's 
view of man, when he begins to suspect that man is bestial 
and lustful as lago believes, when he suspects Desdemona 
herself, the implications of this suspicion are far greater
^11.i.160.
2lII.iii.282 f .
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for Othello than for lago. As he comes under lago's sway, 
he finds, as Hamlet did when he viewed the apparent corru p­
tion of his world, his view of man, his place in the universe, 
and the meaning of that universe called into question. He 
too begins to doubt whether there is a spiritual signifi­
cance to man's life. The suspicion becomes a part of him.
And as he acquiesces in this view, he echoes the very 
language of lago, who has continually spoken of sexual rela­
tions in terms of beasts: the beast with two backs, a black
ram tupping a white ewe, a Barbary horse begetting gennets, 
prime goats, hot monkeys. But lago has not seriously en ter­
tained the possibility that man could be otherwise. Othello, 
however, for whom such a view is as loathsome as it is new, 
begins to use, in a kind of ecstasy of revulsion, the most 
revolting of images in his references to copulation.
I had rather be a toad.
And live upon the vapour in a dungeon.
Than keep a corner in a thing I love.
For others' uses . . . .^
Or as he says later, when in his fullest acceptance of lago's
view he treats his wife's bedroom as a bawdy house, his wife
as a prostitute, and Emilia as a bawd:
The fountain, from the which my current runs.
Or else dries up, to be discarded thence.
Or keep it as a cistern, for foul toads 
To knot and gender in!^
llll.iii.274 ff.
^IV.ii.60 ff.
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The result is that Othello, even more than Hamlet, 
comes to conceive of man as degenerate and unredeemed. And 
his jealousy can be seen as the counterpart to lust, not to 
love.^ But even in this degradation, Othello still maintains 
a belief in Virtue, even though he does not now believe that 
it is operative in man. Thus for him the lustful action of 
which he thinks Desdemona guilty is the Evil which he dete r­
mines to kill. This is Evil which makes men beasts; and it
must not be suffered. "Yet she must die, else she'll betray 
2
more men." Here he has posited Evil; here it can be o p ­
posed. Thus, for Justice he "executes" Desdemona.
But he is, of course, wrong about Desdemona's guilt. 
Hamlet is right in his judgment of Claudius's guilt, as 
Shakespeare lets the audience see; but the guilt is not, 
certainly, "proven" by the mousetrap play. He cannot know 
from Claudius's reaction that he is guilty; but he must, of 
course, act as though he could, because his judgment, al­
though finite and questionable, is his only rational tool.
So it is with Othello, but he judges wrongly from the evi­
dence. But this brings one to another facet of Hamlet's 
problem: can one judge accurately whether things are really
as they appear?
Both Claudius and Polonius, of course, are convinced 
that if they can but get all the details, if they can observe
R. Ridley, op_. c i t ., p. LVI.
^V.ii.6.
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carefully enough, they can discover the cause of Hamlet's 
madness. Polonius is certain that he can sufficiently co m ­
prehend the evidence to make the right decision. Likewise, 
Hamlet long believes that he can answer the overwhelming 
questions that he must ask himself. But all are ultimately 
wrong. And Othello accepts lago's "rational proof" in place
of his faith in Desdemona. It is, to be sure, a flimsy
proof. But it is the "proof" that is given and accepted.
Reputation, Cassio says to lago, is "the immortal
part" of man.^ But reputation is the product of man's jud g ­
ment of a person's worth and character. And we see in 
Othello that this judgment is most fallible. Most notably, 
of course, lago's reputation for honesty fails completely to 
suit with his character. He does, indeed, "appear" to be 
honest, but to judge on the basis of that appearance, which 
is the only evidence one has, is to judge wrongly in this 
instance. On the other hand, Desdemona's reputation for 
honesty and virtue is well founded and accurate; but lago 
believes that it conceals a super-subtle Venetian, and Othello 
comes to accept this view. Honor, reputation, good name-- 
are these in fact indices to the worth of the individual 
soul? Is good name "the immediate jewel of our souls," since 
good name is determined by men? Can man, in other words, 
hope accurately to identify the reality of individual worth 
by reputation?
lll.iii.255.
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But because of Des de mona’s meaning to Othello, the 
import of Othello's judgment is far greater than that of 
simply assessing reputation. In Desdemona Othello sees the 
embodiment of the virtues, the ideals, that he holds, and 
which he thinks man capable of realizing in his person. She 
is truly a living symbol of Virtue to him. A judgment 
against her is a judgment against a view of man and his 
meaning, a rejection of an entire world view. For again
like Hamlet, Othello is judging himself deceived, not simply
in his evaluation of Desdemona a woman, but in his evaluation 
of mankind.
Had it p l e a s ’d heaven 
To try me with affliction, had he r a i n ’d 
All Kinds of sores and shames on my bare head.
S t e e p ’d me in poverty, to the very lips.
Given to captivity me and my hopes,
I should have found in some part of my soul
A drop of patience; but, alas, to make me
A fixed figure, for the time of scorn
To point his slow unmoving fingers at . . . Oh, oh.
Yet could I bear that too, well, very well:
But there, where I have g a r n e r ’d up my heart,
Where either I must live, or bear no life.
The fountain, from the which my current runs.
Or else dries up, to be discarded thence.
Or keep it as a cistern, for foul toads 
To knot and gender in!^
Suffering and affliction, even those of a Job, could not have
affected him so, for this present affliction seems to call
the very existence of Heaven or Virtue into question. How
can he have faith when it is Faith itself that is assailed
and besmirched? Heaven mocks itself indeed. Of course
llV.ii.48 ff.
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O t h e l l o ’s situation is actually much like J o b ’s. Job 
wondered if God were not a criminal; and Othello seems to be 
feeling that God and Heaven are Evil. And like Job he is 
questioning the view of God and Evil that is offered by a 
theodicy. But the suggestion is that Othello is even more 
sorely tried than was Job, that his loss of faith must have 
even more shattering effect on him: the conclusion for him
is, not that God is a criminal, but that Heaven does not 
exist, nor the values of man based on a belief in it.
But this calling into question, this judging of
Meaning, is done on the basis of that limited information and
perspective that man in the Mortal Condition must perforce
employ. Othello can no more transcend the limitations of his
position in the world than Hamlet could his. He cannot, as 
we can, for instance, even stand apart and see lago in a 
fuller perspective. Much less can he discover with clarity 
and surety the meaning of the universe as it shows forth in 
m a n ’s actions.
Much of this theme is, I believe, carried in the 
handkerchief as symbol/proof. The handkerchief is, as has 
often been remarked, a flimsy foundation for such a weighty 
structure as the destruction of Othello. But in the full 
context of the Tragedy this appears to be more of a virtue 
than a fault. Certainly the handkerchief is slender proof 
of Des de mona’s infidelity, and yet it is the only ’’proof” 
that lago can offer when proof is violently demanded of him.
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But proof is to man itself symbolic of reality, or of a p o r ­
tion thereof. It is his way of declaring that he can truly 
discover the "reality" of a situation. Yet the handkerchief 
is also a prior symbol for Othello. It is itself the Virtue 
of Desdemona, who is in turn symbolic proof to Othello that 
finite and infinite, mortal and immortal, spiritual and 
physical meet in man. It is a symbol of the truth of a s y m ­
bol. But more than that, it is a symbol of m a n ’s proof of 
that symbol. By means of this handkerchief, this proof, 
Othello is presuming to assess the full worth and meaning of 
man and the nature of Evil. But the play, the Tragedy, 
asserts that, because of the blindness imposed by his own 
involvement in that which he must try to circumscribe with 
his judgment, man (Othello) cannot with certainty make this 
assessment. Thus the flimsiness of the handkerchief and the 
fragility of the fabric of inference and decision, of which 
it is in part both warp and woof, emerge as evidence of the 
inadequacy of human judgment as an instrument for piercing 
the mystery.
Yet, clearly, in his revulsion at the new view of man 
that he partially embraces, Othello is still championing 
Justice. Tne revulsion comes, in fact, from the disparity 
between that view and his dedication to an idealistic one.
He is never fully lago, even in his lowest moments. Always 
the two views war. There is the constant vacillation between 
contrarieties, an untenable and insane position. In his life
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"chaos is come a g a i n , a n d  he is "perplex'd in the extreme."^
Thus he must, to bring order and meaning to his life again,
discover and destroy the Evil that makes him mad. This he
thinks to do in the murder of Desdemona.
But the Evil is not Desdemona and Cassio. It is in
the Mortal Condition of Othello himself. Most often students
of Othello view lago as Evil incarnate, as Satan himself.
And indeed there are many instances in the play that force
3an association of the two upon us, but if we make the i d e n ­
tification of lago and Evil, if we insist on externalizing 
and localizing it, we are failing to see the essential form 
and nature of Evil as it is revealed in the Mortal Condition 
by the dramatist. lago is, to be sure, the only example in 
the play of total Evil , the only one in whom are found all
^III.iii.92.
2v.ii.347.
3
For example :
l a g o . If sanctimony, and a frail vow, betwixt an erring ba r ­
barian, and a super-subtle Venetian, be not too hard 
for my wits, and all the tribe of h e l l , thou shalt 
enjoy her . . . . [Tt alios mine! [T. iii. 355 ff.)
E m i l . If any wretch ha' put this in your head,
Let heaven" requite it with the serpent's curse.-"
(IV.ii.15 f .)
L o d . Where is this viper? bring the villain forth.
0 t h . I look down towards his feet, but that's a fable 
If that thou be'st a devil, I cannot kill thee.
(Wounds lago.) (V.ii.285 ff.)
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the forms of Evil. But lago's success is dependent upon the 
evil in man, together with the limitations of man's vision 
that proceed from the nature of his existence and which form 
a part of the Evil which he must contend with. lago is, in 
fact, a sort of midwife to the potential evil in man. He 
brings out the evil that is already latent in Othello-- 
jealousy, rage, intemperate judgment and slander. He delivers 
up the evil of Roderigo— envy, cupidity, and murderous 
passion. He causes the weakness of Cassio to predominate for 
a moment and therefore to come forth as evil. Thus Othello 
demonstrates that the tragic figure must finally confront the 
Evil in himself. He discovers that he is a part of the Evil 
which he pursues.
It is, of course, possible to view, in one sense, 
lago and Desdemona as the contending parts of Othello's 
character, as almost his good and bad angels. Certainly from 
the point of the "seduction" of Othello by lago in the third 
act, to the revelation of Desdemona's innocence, the internal 
struggle between the view of man that lago supplies and the 
faith Othello has in the ideals that Desdemona symbolizes for 
him renders him a truly divided man. But the point of this 
psychic division and battle is not whether his baser or 
nobler part will triumph, but that, in the condition of m o r ­
tal man which the Tragedy defines, the division and battle 
exist. And this fact is, moreover, a part of the central 
paradox of the play and of the Tragedy: belief in Desdemona
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the symbol is what causes Othello to kill Desdemona the 
woman. For when Othello comes to accept the view that Desde­
mona is unfaithful, he more strongly than ever clings to b e ­
lief in Virtue as an ideal by which she must be judged. And 
in trying to bring the ideal and individual man together, in 
attempting to remove the possibility that they cannot be 
joined, he, like Hamlet, himself emphasizes and extends the 
d i v i s i o n .
Moreover, when Othello discovers his implication in 
the guilt, in the Evil, he continues to act from his commit­
ment to the ideals of Virtue and Justice.^ He killed Desde­
mona as an act of Justice. Now he can only continue to af­
firm that Justice by carrying out the execution on himself. 
Like Oedipus he is both punisher and punished. And certainly 
Othello's nobility is greater at this point than ever before 
in the play: he unflinchingly stands by his earlier practice
even when he knows that he must himself be the victim. Just 
as in former times he was justicer to those who traduced the 
state, so now will he be to him who has traduced Virtue.
The play ends affirmatively; Othello declares the
^It does appear that insight into the true nature of 
his predicament by the tragic figure is a necessary part of 
Tragedy, inasmuch as it focuses the separate strands of the 
play's discovery of the Mortal Condition so that we can see 
it clearly as revealed. However, the degree of insight 
varies (Oedipus, for instance, recognizes his true situation 
somewhat more fully than Hamlet , but perhaps less than 
Othello). But the fullest awareness of the tragic meaning 
of the Mortal Condition is that of the audience, for to them 
only is the total significance revealed.
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validity of the ideal in his execution of himself, so that 
although he is defeated on the physical plane he is nonet he­
less victorious. But the victory does lie in the tragedy of 
Othello's (tragic man's) predicament, which must bring him 
to this paradoxical conclusion. And there is still the 
possibility that finite and infinite have not met. The 
mystery of Evil is clearly revealed, while at the same time 
mortal man makes his inevitable and quixotic assault on it 
as a problem. The Mortal Condition prevails, and from it 
comes Tragedy's mournful note of noble elevation.
CHAPTER IV
THEODICY
More often than not, works which are sometimes lo o s e ­
ly termed Tragedies manage to blunt or dull to some extent 
the sharp and painful blade of Tragedy. Often, of course, 
matters of form and style serve to mar the tragic effect; 
but as was observed earlier, an investigation of these 
specifics is not truly an investigation of the nature of 
Tragedy, but rather of literary form. Tne more central 
reason for the impurity of most "Tragedies" appears to be 
the absence, loss, or abandonment by the poet of the point 
of view of man in the Mortal Condition, the ground of T ra­
gedy. At times this view is absent from the start; at others 
it is inadequately maintained or contradicted; at still 
others it is rejected in favor of a transcendent and re­
solving view.
Many great works of drama would appear to be of this 
latter type. Some examples are obvious, notably those works 
which are patently religious in flavor and intent. Some, 
like Milton's Samson A g o n i s t e s , are perhaps somewhat less 
obviously of this type, but still generally enough recognized
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as such to demand no demonstration. Others there are, h ow ­
ever, which, though they are basically of this type, are often 
thought of as Tragedies. The confusion is by no means s ur ­
prising. These are the plays which demonstrate the most 
pressing need for a theodicy, for a resolution or solution 
to suffering m a n ’s problems and questions about his universe. 
They present the same uncertain, mysterious, painful world 
as Tragedy; they recognize, in varying degrees, the Mortal 
Condition. Often, apparently, none of the crushing force of 
man's Tragedy is lost to the writer of the theodicy. In fact, 
it is from an awareness, and experience, of this Tragedy, 
that the theodicy proceeds. In our western culture no 
serious and profound theodicy has attempted to gainsay the 
agonies, physical and spiritual, of humanity. These agonies 
are the life blood of the theodicy, just as they are of Tra­
gedy. The Tragedy and the theodicy are therefore more than 
similar in material: they are identical. The difference is
in the point of view from which the material is presented.
And this is a crucial difference, a clear understanding of 
which must further clarify our understanding of Tragedy.
Philoctetes
The Philoctetes of Sophocles is a case in point. It 
is a beautiful and affecting play. But what kind of play is 
it? Is it a Tragedy, as it is usually classed? Surely it 
is vastly different from such a Tragedy as Oedipus the K i n g .
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But how different? Is it simply a matter of an injudicious 
choice by Sophocles of a concluding incident? Do we simply 
apply Aristotle's advice against the poet's use of a deus 
ex machina to end his play? Why should he not? Is this more 
than a formal fault?
To answer these questions one must go back to the 
Philoctetes with our definition o f  Tragedy as a t o o l .
Clearly, through most of Ph il octetes , there is a 
strong accentuation of the mystery of Evil, There is a kind 
of continuing circular search for the cause of Evil, a search 
that, though it is primarily Phil oc t e t e s 's , is in large m e a ­
sure shared by Neopt ol emus. And up to the appearance of 
Heracles at the end, the play's presentation of this search 
mostly reveals uncertainty. At times Philoctetes makes the 
gods the authors of Evil (his evil in particular): "How am
I to deem of these things, or wherein shall I praise them, 
when, praising the ways of the gods, I find that the gods 
are e v i l ? A t  other times he places all the blame on the 
Atridae. Likewise, Neoptolemus alternately blames himself 
and Philoctetes. And through it all runs the suggestion, 
often voiced by the Chorus, that Philoctetes must bear at 
least part of the blame for his affliction, since he is too
stubborn in his adversity to submit to what he is assured
2
is the better course.
^Sophocles, o p . c i t . , p. 341.
^The Chorus says to Philoctetes: "'Tis thou, 'tis
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But how can Philoctetes and Neoptolemus be sure which 
is the right course? By their own lights, of course, they 
cannot. Each of these two men is firmly committed to an 
ideal of Justice by which he must judge others and their 
actions. When, like Job, Philoctetes is judging the gods 
criminals, he is, again like Job, still affirming the e x i s t ­
ence of this ideal, by which they can be so judged.
Yet what, the play asks, is the right action? And 
by its entire action it stresses that the man caught in the 
uncertain condition of mortality cannot by himself judge 
without fear of error. Neoptolemus is at one time Philo c­
tetes' s friend; at another his enemy; and seemingly at times 
both. Moreover, Philoctetes is unquestionably partly re­
sponsible for his situation by virtue of his dedication to 
the belief that the Atridae and their cause are inherently 
unjust. Also, the ambiguous role and utterances of the 
Chorus reflect this uncertainty: they too join in deceiving
Philoctetes, even while lamenting his condition and offering 
philosophical reflections on it. One is, of course, tempted 
by sympathy with Philoctetes, and by a natural inclination 
to simplify the moral problem, to pronounce the Atridae 
guilty of pure and simple evil. However, the play makes 
clear that, even though they are guilty of great inhumanity.
thou thyself, ill-fated man, that hast so decreed; this f o r ­
tune to which thou art captive comes not from without, or 
from a stronger hand: for, when it was in thy power to show
wisdom, thy choice was to reject the better fate, and to 
accept the worse" ( I b i d . , p. 363).
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they too are pursuing a conviction that their course of 
action is just. And we are not given grounds for judging 
them wrong.
In fine, this play shows man engaged in the always 
human attempt to identify Evil and then to act accordingly. 
And it shows that from this attempt come confusion and u n ­
certainty. To this extent, the play conforms perfectly to 
the view presented in Tragedy. But with the appearance of 
Heracles this view ceases to prevail. The mystery that has 
clouded the lives of these men is dismissed by the declara­
tions of Heracles, when he points the way and explains the 
significance of the suffering of Philoctetes. The vision of 
the meaning of life given here transcends that of man in the 
Mortal Condition--Tragic man.
The significance of the myth on which the play is 
based is not clear. But it appears to be something of this 
sort: the mingling in man of the immortal (bow and arrows
of Heracles) and mortal (wound inflicted by the serpent) 
brings suffering. There are echoes in it of Antigone : 
"Nothing that is vast enters the life of mortals without a 
curse." But the tragic uncertainty that surrounds man's 
experience of this mingling of mortal and immortal, the 
possibility, for example, that Phil oc tetes's conviction that 
there is Justice which he can accept and stand on is mis- 
taken--this is not accentuated at the end. Here the play
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takes on the cast of a theodicy.^ We are nearer to Job than 
to Oedipus the K i n g . Philoctetes does not persist in a f ­
firming his own view of Justice. He submits to Heracles 
(God) just as Job does. He accepts the mystery. He con­
fesses his inability to penetrate it.
Moreover, Philoctetes does not rise through and 
above suffering and defeat. He is, to be sure, defeated in 
a sense. But it is a wholly positive defeat; that is, its
meaning is clear. The play declares that his life has
meaning in an ordered scheme, and that Justice will in fact
be done. But the tragic uncertainty is gone. And his suf­
fering is not made a condition of his glory, except from a 
divine point of view--a very different thing. The play ends 
hopefully and affirmatively. And although one can say that 
it is a melancholy thought that in his uncertainty and human 
limitation man will and must suffer, as that observation is 
presented by this play it remains only melancholy and not 
fully tragic. There is pity, but not e l e v a t i o n . .
Thus we can see that the P h i l o ct et es, though p os ­
sessed of many of the features of Tragedy, is not pure Tra­
gedy. It is much nearer to Tragedy than many poets were 
ever able to come. But it ends up in the class with Job. 
This is, of course, worthy company for any play. Job is un­
doubtedly one of the greatest literary expressions of man.
^See n. 1, p. 25, for a definition of theodicy.
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But it is important to keep clearly in mind that Job does 
not end on a truly tragic note. It, like P h i l o c t e t e s , 
stresses the profound mystery of Evil in man's life and the 
essential suffering of his lot; but again like Philoctetes 
(with no doubt more profound religious conviction), it moves 
to the resolution that can come only from God and God's 
view. Obviously these two works are not simply expressions 
of optimism; but neither are they Tragedies. They are, in 
fact, a marrying of the two. But it is the view of the 
theodicy that finally rules the whole. The Mortal Condition 
does not prevail.
Oedipus at Colonus 
When, in his contemplation of suffering and Evil, 
man shifts his gaze from the mystery of man's involvement in 
Evil and his paradoxical role of victor and victim, to the 
function of the mystery in a divinely-ordered universe of 
purpose and meaning, he rejects Tragedy and accepts theodicy. 
He does not deny suffering; it is suffering (and Evil) it­
self that brings him to justify and resolve. Without the 
need to account for human suffering, what we know as theod­
icy would not exist. But the need to account, to explain, 
to justify--this need, when pursued to the construction of 
a theodicy, takes one beyond the experience of suffering man; 
it overcomes the Mortal Condition by means of a transcendent 
view of man's position in the world. The mystery remains, 
to be sure; but for the uncertainty which arises from an
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immersion in the Mortal Condition, in the destructive element, 
is substituted a certainty that is derived from God, for 
whom there is no mystery. There is no logical necessity why 
one cannot view the life of man as both Tragedy and theodicy. 
Indeed, it seems likely that a recognition of the tragic 
attitude will precede the statement of theodicy. But they 
do not exist in true simultaneity: t h e y  a r e  a l t e r n a t i v e
views. And though not of necessity mutually exclusive b e ­
cause of philosophical or religious commitment, they are e x ­
clusive because of point of view assumed: the one proceeds
from the unflinching view of man suffering his mortality; 
the other comes from the view of man declaring his immortal­
ity.
The Philoctetes as a whole makes this latter decla ra­
tion. The simply tragic implications of the mystery are 
denied or rejected. And whatever glory is affirmed for man 
is that of man immortal , while Tragedy affirms the glory 
(paradoxical as it is) of man m o r t a l . But in Ph i l o c t e t e s , 
as in Job, the tension between the two views is great indeed. 
The resolution is that of theodicy, but the potentiality of 
Tragedy is at all times on the point of realization. There 
is a curious ambivalence about the point of view chosen: it
is that of both Tragedy and theodicy, with the latter gaining 
an inconclusive victory. The Oedipus at Colonus , on the 
other hand, maintains the transcendent view that marks 
theodicy. Here the Tragedy of Oedipus has been left behind.
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Here serenity prevails, for despite the agonies of Oedipus, 
and despite the mourning and despair of Antigone and Ismene 
(they are still, after all, in the Mortal Condition them­
selves and will in their persons yet participate in Tra­
gedy ) --still , a calm optimism pervades the play.^ No tragic 
assault on Evil is made here. The questioning is quiet; the 
discovery of the mystery is played down. Even Oedipus him­
self exhibits nothing but reverence for the gods in his
^This is the ground bass of the play, so to speak. 
Specific instances of its strong sounding are many, but none 
better, perhaps, than when the Chorus describes the beauty 
and comfort and sweetness and bounty of Colonus, and where 
the mention of the "gray-leafed olive" suggests the mystery 
of immortality;
"Stranger, in this land of goodly steeds thou hast 
come to earth's fairest home, even to our white Colonus; 
where the nightingale, a constant guest, trills her clear 
note in the covert of green glades, dwelling amid the wine- 
dark ivy and the god's inviolate bowers, rich in berries and 
fruit, unvisited by sun, unvexed by wind of any storm; where 
the reveller Dionysus ever walks the ground, companion of 
the nymphs that nursed him.
"And, fed of heavenly dew, the narcissus blooms by 
morn with fair clusters, crown of the Great Goddesses from 
of yore; and the crocus blooms with golden beam. Nor fail 
the sleepless founts whence the waters of Cephisus wander, 
but each day with stainless tide he moveth over the plains 
of the land's swelling bosom, for the giving of quick in­
crease; nor hath the Muses' quire abhorred this place, nor 
Aphrodite of the golden rein.
"And a thing there is such as I know not by fame on 
Asian ground, or as ever born in the great Dorian isle of 
Pelops,--a growth unconquered, self-renewing, a terror to 
the spears of the foeraen , a growth which mightily flourishes 
in this land,--the gray-leafed olive, nurturer of children. 
Youth shall not mar it by the ravage of his hand, nor any 
who dwells with old age; for the sleepless eye of the Morian 
Zeus beholds it, and the gray-eyed Athena" (Sophocles, op. 
cit. , pp. 86-87 ).
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attitude and speeches. Despite his suffering, he has faith 
in them: he does not rail or question. And in O e d i p u s ’s
death we see not defeat but victory, an unequivocal 
v i c t o r y .^
Oedipus at Colonus does not show the mystery of Evil 
by presenting tragic man attacking it as problem; rather, it 
postulates the mystery from the first and stresses the need 
for an affirmative acceptance of the mystery. The central 
concern here, as in Philoctetes , is with the acceptance by 
the people (by man) of this mystery, as a necessary step t o ­
ward a realization of his (man's, not the tragic figure's) 
immortal potential--toward , in other words, the validation 
of theodicy.
Strikingly enough, both these plays deal with the 
exile of polluted man; and even more strikingly, both insist 
on the necessity of his return for the glory and welfare of 
his people. In some fashion, these plays seem to say, the 
sin, evil, or pollution of these men is an essential feature 
of the success of the people. But as we consider these
^That the choral and lyric assertion of the desir­
ability of death as an end to the natural suffering of man 
is a feature of most all Greek drama does not alter the 
significance of this distinction. The fact is, simply, that 
no matter with what frequency they utter such thoughts, the 
Greeks exhibited in the dramas do cling to life. Indeed, 
this lamentation appears to be no other than an expression 
of a feeling of self-pity in the face of suffering; not so 
jejeune, no doubt, but no more literal than the more common 
"I wish I were dead" of today. Moreover, Oedipus's death 
is not shown as only an escape from, but a victory through 
life.
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plays, we are struck by the realization that the emphasis 
is on the connection of this badge of mortality, as we may 
call it, and the well-being of the people, not on its connec­
tion with the tragic "victory" and glory of the individual.
In fact, the emphasis is on the taking back itself.
In the P h i l o c t e t e s , of course, there is more a m b i ­
guity, more "discovery" of mystery. The question remains 
whether Philoctetes is being reaccepted into the society of 
man on his journey to Troy or simply used (although Phil oc ­
tetes' s own future career is given unambiguously enough).
But there is no question whether Neoptolemus finally accepts 
the whole man, badge of mortality and all. In a gesture of 
humanity and compassion, he embraces both his strengths and 
weaknesses, just as the Athenians wholeheartedly accept and 
protect Oedipus, with all his sins and afflictions known.
The Thebans wish merely to use Oedipus to their advantage, 
without according him the dignity of membership in the race; 
likewise, the Atridae want only to bring the bow and arrows 
back for the conquest of Troy, also without acknowledging 
the worth of the man. And one cannot fail to note that each 
of these groups attempts to accomplish its end in much the 
same way as the other--or that both the Athenians and Neop­
tolemus give their protection along with their acknowledgment 
of the humanity of the sufferers.
In each play we witness a contest of sorts, over who 
will receive the benefits that the exile alone can bestow.
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And we are left in no doubt by either play as to the reality 
of these benefits. In Philoctetes the benefits are clearly 
enunciated by Heracles himself. In Oedipus at Colonus the 
apparent translation of Oedipus bodily and miraculously to 
the "other world" is itself sufficient proof of the more 
than mortal importance of Oedipus. Moreover, the contests 
are decided, finally, in favor of those who admit the su f ­
ferer's claims on their humanity. It is not a question of 
which ones recognize the power he can bring to their cause: 
all contenders accept unquestioningly the statements of the 
Oracles. But only the Athenians are willing to receive 
Oedipus because of his suffering, and because he is a man.
And only Neoptolemus feels more for the sufferings and 
wrongs endured by Philoctetes than for the glory to be gained 
by having his aid in the destruction of Troy. Thus the e m o ­
tional appeal of the unfortunate central figure is joined 
with the central dramatic and thematic concern of the play, 
to give direction to the one and content to the other.
What we seem to meet, then, in the dramatic handling 
of these two myths, is the idea that man must recognize his 
kinship with the polluted, the sinful; that he cannot drive 
sin and pollution out with the exile; that he is himself 
wearer of the same badge of mortality. But all of this is 
part and parcel of Tragedy, and these plays do not stop here. 
They insist that so long as one attempts so to exile the sin 
of mortality, so long must he be incapable of achieving the
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transcendent view that annuls Tragedy. Man cannot realize 
his full humanity, these plays say, a humanity that ^  in 
fact aligned with the immortal, until he has accepted his 
mortality. And this is the point of view of theodicy. It 
asks for a rejection of the tragic attempt to solve the 
"problem" of Evil. The acceptance of Oedipus by the 
Athenians (and of Philoctetes by Neoptolemus) argues an a c ­
ceptance of this adjuration, a refusal on their part to c on­
tinue to attempt to penetrate the mystery. They now take 
the mystery to their bosoms, and with it come awe and hope 
of salvation. And the hope is given overtones of certainty 
or conviction by the miraculous conclusions of the plays.
The mystery has become, not tragic, but religious mystery.
Athalie
Racine's A t h a l i e , an uncharacteristic neo-classical 
work, but one that is recognized as an important, if troub le­
some, play, is an interesting example of the differences be­
tween Tragedy and theodicy. This somber and majestically 
restrained treatment of the Biblical account of King Joash 
and Athalie shows how closely allied the two points of view 
can be in what is ultimately a theodicy. Moreover, it indi­
cates the poet's difficulty, in such a close alliance, in 
keeping his purpose consistent and clear.
Through all the action of the play leading up to the 
triumphant accession of Joash to the throne, the potential­
ity of Tragedy is present. The high priest Jehoiada's
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unwavering certainty that God will second all their attempts 
and set Joash on the throne in the midst of powerful and 
ruling enemies is not shared by the rest of the Hebrews.
The possibility that he is over optimistic is expressed often 
by Jehosheba and the Chorus. Their recognition of the in­
scrutability of man's fate and God's intentions serves to 
establish a somewhat skeptical air around all of Jehoiada's 
declarations and assurances. The present peril of their 
people, their past persecutions--these join in their a s sess ­
ment of the chances for success in the present venture to 
cause us to anticipate a reversal. Jehosheba questions 
whether one can know God's intentions when Jehoiada is 
assuring her that they will have God's protection in their 
enterprise of proclaiming Joash king:
Who knoweth if this child was for their sin 
Wot doomed at birth, like all that impious line;
Or if God , setting him from such a race 
Apart, for David's sake will show him grace?^
And when she prays that her love will not prove hurtful to 
Joash,^ the possibility of the tragic reversal, the p o s s i ­
bility of the emergence of paradox and mystery in their a t ­
tempts to defy the evil they have identified in the de s t r u c ­
tion of Joash and the line of David--the possibility is so 
strong that it sets up an expectation in the beholder, an
^Jean Baptiste Racine, The Best Plays of R a c i n e , 
trans. Lacy Lockert (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1936), p. 331.
^Ibid.
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expectation which is underscored when Jehosheba asks Jehoiada,
In blind assurance is there no offence?
Using mankind to carry out his plans,
Did not the Lord himself arm Jehu's hands?
The tragic uncertainty grows particularly strong as 
the play moves on toward the climax. A sense of tragic in­
volvement marks the songs of the Chorus: Jehoiada's pro­
phetic vision gives them no ease,
Salome
At last God deigns to speak his will;
But of what he doth now to his prophet reveal.
Who shall teach us to know the sense?
Doth he arm for our defense.
Or to crush us under his heel?
All the Chorus, Singing
0 the hope! 0 the threat! 0 the darkling mystery!
Both what good and what evil seem here interwoven!
How can ever with so much anger be
Made accord so much love?2
But the expectation is not answered. The play offers 
no Tragedy. Athalie dies, to be sure, defeated by God; but 
Athalie is not the subject of the play, as Racine points out 
in the preface.^ The drama ends in complete triumph for the 
Jews and their God. Joash is crowned and rules; Jehoiada's 
blind conviction has been vindicated; and God has destroyed 
his enemies.
By this end, fearful yet to justice owed.
Learn, King of Judah, nor forget thou e'er.
^ Ib id . , p . 3 72 . 
^Ibid . , p. 376. 
^I bi d. , p. 315.
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That rulers have in heaven a Judge severe 
Who aids the innocent in their distress 
And is a father to the fatherless.!
The point of view from which the play is presented is one 
that has left questioning and mystery behind. What remains 
is triumph and assurance. The individuals, with the exception 
of Jehoiada, live in the uncertainty of the Mortal Condition, 
but theirs is not the point of view of the play. In order to 
justify the ways of God to man, Racine had to move to the G o d ­
like point of view of the theodicy. The open question of 
whether Justice triumphs in m a n ’s world has given way before 
the omniscient assurance that it does.
This appears to me unquestionably to be the nature 
of Athalie. But a further complication should be noted. The 
proleptic vision of J o a s h ’s future defections, which is given 
by Jehoiada in his trance and which is recalled somewhat 
ominously in the last speech of the play, "nor forget thou 
e ’er,/That rulers have in heaven a Judge severe"--this vision 
works in opposition to the prevailing point of view. It c a n ­
not, of course, completely cancel it out and transform the 
play from theodicy to Tragedy, but it can and does give a 
slightly mixed conclusion to the work. Whether this mixture 
results from an unconscious inclination toward the point of 
view of limited judgment on the part of Racine, from a greater 
sympathy with the tragic point of view which he constructed
^Ibid. , p. 405 .
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the play to cancel out than with the intellectual one he p ro­
moted, or whether it shows Racine's confusion about what he 
wished to do or was doing, it would seem to argue that 
Racine was too uncritically influenced by the Biblical account 
as he constructed his drama. And the result is a slightly 
impure work.
Doctor Faustus 
Marred as it is by textual corruptions, Marlowe's 
Doctor Faustus is still one of the most powerful and com­
pelling of Elizabethan "Tragedies." One must look far to 
find a more overwhelming statement of loss and destruction, 
a more concentrated focus on a soul's damnation. Yet surely 
it is a puzzling play, one which, though we "feel" that it 
is Tragedy, we have difficulty accounting for theoretically, 
with its strange and wonderful mixture of Renaissance and 
Medieval themes, with its Renaissance man caught in a Med i e ­
val world. For we know that the problems which the play 
raises cannot be handled in terms of "dramatic craft." The 
problems of this play, we feel sure, are not that elements 
of the Medieval morality play are joined whole to the emerging 
form of Renaissance drama. This seems more to be the symptom 
than the ailment. Or, to put it another way, the problems 
raised appear to be both anterior and posterior to these 
formal idiosyncracies. Can we be satisfied to call Doctor 
Faustus a tragic morality play?
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Let us consider a moment. What, first of all, are 
the tragic features of the play? We know by the end of 
Faustus's first speech that he is unwilling to accept the 
limitations on man's mind and spirit that he finds ac k n o w l ­
edged by all the disciplines of study. Divine theology, the 
last and best of these studies, carries only one melancholy 
message to Faustus: "The reward o f sin is d e a t h , and all
men are sinful. Not, Faustus thinks, a very hopeful or 
reassuring message.
Is this not a recognition of Evil in the very mode 
of great Tragedy? Indeed it would seem so. The play has
hardly begun when Faustus identifies the Evil that besets him
and determines to oppose it. Mortality is Evil. The wages 
of sin is death, and all men are sinful. Except that Faustus 
will not have it so. This is, he judges, an unjust law, and 
cannot be tamely borne. Therefore he seeks through magic, 
through necromancy, the freedom and immortality which the 
Mortal Condition will and can not allow.
Faustus's pursuit of this ideal, or flight from
mortality, leads him obviously deeper into guilt and to his 
own destruction. His very life testifies, at last, to the 
truth of the law: the wages of sin is death, and all men
are sinful. His denial of the theme of mortality has
^Christopher Marlowe, The Tragical History of Doctor 
Fa u s t u s , in The Chief Elizabethan Dram atists , ed. William 
Allan Neilson CSoston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1911), Scene I, 1. 39.
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provided the instrument on which the theme can be played.
It is the music of Tragedy. And its theme is clearly the 
mystery of Evil as well as the suffering of man within this 
mystery, of which he is an unwilling part.
While we are thus resting in the judgment that Doctor 
Faustus is a Tragedy, however, we suddenly realize that the 
Evil with which the play concludes has placed us on another 
plane. The Evil has ceased to be the Mortal Condition and 
has become eternal damnation. Faustus*s soul is eternally 
damned for his sin, and Faustus knows it. But this is a new 
element in Tragedy. The uncertainty is gone. Where is the 
hope that Faustus may have been destroyed in the defense of 
a greater and more noble ideal than the one he found existing 
round him? It has been left behind with the man in the 
Mortal Condition. All the meaning of Faustus's life is made 
clear. His relation to infinity, the relation of God to 
man--these we now know. For the point of view is that of 
God; the statements about Faustus's life, those of theodicy.
One can, I think, argue that Faustus's pursuit of 
sin and Evil, even in the face of all certainty that it is 
Evil, is further clarification of the Mortal Condition and 
contributes to Tragedy; that is, that Faustus's inability to 
swerve from this pursuit even though he knows it will win 
him eternal damnation is evidence of how man is constrained 
by his nature to follow error and pursue his destruction.
But if this argument is valid, one must, I believe, reach
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another conclusion. As has been said, the point of view 
which lets us know precisely what is the final meaning of 
Faustus's actions is one that presumes to understand more 
of the meaning of life and its outcome than mortal man can 
know. It is a view that transcends that mortality. There­
fore, a theodicy which presents the world of Doctor Faustus 
is one which focuses not so much on the tragic experience 
of it as on the pessimistic (nihilistic?) understanding of 
it.
A comparison of Faustus and Milton's Satan will help 
to clarify this point, perhaps. Satan, as Milton presents 
him, falls because of his refusal to accept limitation.
While still in Heaven, he denies any limitations on his power 
and freedom. After his expulsion, he continues to refuse to 
accept the limitations which he now recognizes all too 
clearly. The core of his being is this refusal; the nature 
of sin, his persistence. He justifies his expulsion and 
damnation, therefore, with every moment of his existence.
He will choose Evil as his good.
Likewise, Marlowe's Faustus chooses Evil, knowing, 
as does Satan, that it is simply Evil. He refuses to repent. 
He says, of course, that he is tormented unspeakably by 
devils when he thinks of repentance. But no possibility of 
accepting this defense is allowed by the play. We are told 
unequivocally that if Faustus would repent he would be saved. 
Like Satan he chooses Evil as his good.
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Such a picture of man has striking implications when 
given from the point of view that defines theodicy. It sug­
gests that man will always choose Evil; that, like Satan, it 
is his nature to do so. No salvation is possible to him, 
therefore. He will necessarily suffer damnation. This is 
hardly a Christian view. Doctor Faustus is very unlike 
F a r a d i se L o s t , which is also a theodicy. In Milton's work 
it is Satan, not man, who must be damned. Marlowe's play 
might almost be called a Satanic theodicy. It is a theodicy 
of despair. God is not only not denied but affirmed. And 
his omnipotence is admitted. But he works toward Evil, for 
man, because man is so constituted as to be incapable of 
salvation: he can only have damnation. Here is the attitude
of despair that critics have often seemed to find in Tragedy, 
the attitude which has seemed to preclude Christian Tragedy. 
(One is tempted to think, indeed, that recognition of the 
implications of this play by Marlowe's contemporaries was the 
major cause of his being branded "atheistical.")
But the despair that marks Doctor Faustus is not a 
function of Tragedy. Most of the ingredients of Tragedy are 
present in the work, and much of the play produces a tragic 
note and response. But the Tragedy is vitiated, because the 
point of view goes beyond Tragedy to despair. Of course one 
pities Faustus: his exit is deeply moving and rending. But
pity does not seem to belong solely to Tragedy, just as it 
does not seem, by itself, to distinguish Tragedy. Marlowe
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attempts to do more than show the meaning of mortality as 
man experiences it: he states the meaning of mortality as
it is, seen from the light of eternity. Perhaps one can 
usefully term Doctor Faustus a tragic morality play, if he 
makes a great many reservations and modifications. But it 
seems to me more helpful to judge it by the definition of 
Tragedy employed here. For then, I think, one better sees 
what Doctor Faustus is, by seeing what it is not- - T r a g e d y .
CHAPTER V 
THE TRAGEDY WITHIN: LOVE AND HONOR
Vary few people would maintain today that the heroic 
plays of the Restoration stage are effective Tragedies, or 
even effective plays. Indeed there appears to be a unanimity 
of opinion among students of the drama that the heroic play 
is simply bombastic, artificial, and trivial. The worst 
(and that is most) of heroic plays are cold, and often empty, 
exercises in purple rhetoric as an end in itself. And surely 
this makes them bad plays. But does this judgment in itself 
tell us that they are not Tragedies? Not unless our d e f i n i ­
tion of Tragedy is that it is a good play. And yet the 
general reaction of readers of these plays is to say that 
they are wretched pieces of work and therefore not Tragedies. 
Moreover, this reaction has given rise to a commonplace of 
dramatic criticism: that the conflict of love and honor
(the fundamental conflict of the heroic play) is incapable 
of yielding Tragedy.
If nothing more were at stake than the reputation of 
the characteristic heroic play, one would be inclined to 
allow such reasoning to pass: the readers' sensibilities
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have not misled them. These plays are, in general, h o p e ­
lessly bad. But the heroic play is the neo-classic type, 
and its theme is that of virtually all neo-classic Tragedy. 
This is the kind of Tragedy written, for the most part, by 
Corneille, Racine, and Dryden. It is the kind of Tragedy 
that characterizes "the last great age of Tragedy."
Therefore, we must demand some better reasons for 
declaring that Tragedy cannot derive from the conflict of 
love and honor. For when one comes to deal with a good play 
whose theme is that conflict, without a better theory of what 
constitutes Tragedy he is hard pressed to judge what is be­
fore him. What, for instance, does one make of P h a e d r a , or 
Polyeuc te , or Br i t a n n i c u s , or All for Love ? Seldom are these 
plays dismissed so cavalierly. They are, in fact, commonly 
called Tragedies.
But are they? Certainly this is a question which any 
study of Tragedy must attempt to answer. It is not, of 
course, the purpose of the present study to survey or define 
neo-classic Tragedy. However, a consideration of neo-classic 
Tragedy would seem to be helpful as clarification of the 
definition of Tragedy. For to the extent that one can point 
to limitations of that Tragedy, to that extent he can more 
accurately perceive what he takes Tragedy to be.
In order thus to clarify further my theory of Tra­
gedy, it seems best to attempt to characterize heroic Tra­
gedy by way of an historical question: why did Tragedy
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devolve into the heroic play? For an answer to this question 
can best show, I believe, by negative example, some of the 
essential features of Tragedy.
The question itself is, of course, a common one.
Herbert Muller works into it thus:
Beginning with Beaumont and Fletcher there was an obvious 
falling off in intensity and seriousness, as tragic drama 
declined into romantic story and symbolic imagery became 
merely decorative. This decline is somewhat puzzling, 
since it did not reflect an era of increasing order and 
security. Rather, there was more reason for tension. 
Political, economic, and religious strife was to c ul ­
minate in the beheading of Charles I. In the world of 
thought, men were catching on to the implications of what 
Galileo had discovered with his "fantastic glass" (men­
tioned by the wicked cardinal in The Duchess of M a 1f i ).
Sir Henry Wotton reported to King James that Galileo 
"hath overthrown all former astronomy--for we must have 
a new sphere to save the appearances." John Donne d e ­
spaired of the appearances. As a result of the "new 
philosophy," he wrote in his "First Anniversary,"
"'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone.
All just supply, and all relation . . . .
The world's proportion disfigured is."
Such tensions help to explain why he and the other "meta ­
physicals" wrought their poetry of paradox. And although 
this cerebral poetry was ill-suited to drama, it forces 
the question why both thought and feeling grew more super­
ficial in contemporaneous dram a.1
The basis of Muller's question appears to be the assumption 
that such intellectual ferment as rocked the seventeenth 
century, especially in the first half of the century, and the 
loss of stability, the "dissociation of sensibility," should 
produce, rather than a less vital and serious drama, a more 
serious one, and one well suited to the production of Tra­
gedy. Why, in other words, he is asking, is not the
^ O p . c i t . , p . 2 0 0.
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generation of greater doubt and insecurity a fertile ground 
for Tragedy, as it would seem to be?
The answer is not, I think, far to seek. It is 
potentially present in the remark of Sir Henry Wotton that 
Galileo "hath overthrown all former astronomy--for we must 
have a new sphere to save the appearances."
That the growth of science and the attendant m e c h ­
anization of the universe which tended to separate man from 
his world caused seventeenth-century man to experience a 
kind of spiritual isolation is also a commonplace in the 
history of ideas. The new astronomy, we know, broke the 
circle of perfection of the Medieval world and set man apart 
from a world which was increasingly seen as mechanical and 
impersonal, and above all external. Marjorie Nicolson puts 
this view succinctly:
Modern cosmology, like all the earlier ones, is based on 
analogy. 3ut we are aware that it is an analogy. We 
know that we are attempting to explain the nature of the 
universe, the world, and man by figures of speech delib­
erately drawn from historians and natural scientists.
We describe our world in similes. Our Elizabethan ances­
tors thought of their world in metaphors. The world was 
not simply like an animal; it was animate. The repeti­
tion of pattern, design, function they found in the body 
of man was not invented by human ingenuity; it actually 
existed in the three worlds made by God in His image. 
There was basic correspondence between man's body and 
the body of the world, between man's soul and the soul 
of the universe.1
But what Miss Nicolson describes is probably better seen as
a change in the world of perception than in the world of
^Marjorie Hope Nicolson, The Breaking of the Circle 
(rev. ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 196071 pi 2.
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thought; that is, a change in a way of apprehending the world 
rather than in the way of thinking about it.^ It seems at 
least likely that Medieval man (who was not only the ancestor, 
but part, of Renaissance man) perceived a unified (or at any 
rate, more unified) world. He probably perceived a more 
numinous world and made less rigid distinctions between 
"mind" and "matter" and, therefore, between himself and the 
"external" world. Thus his metaphors were not products of 
conscious comparisons, but rather of simple perceptions. He 
did not only think of the world in metaphors but so perceived 
i t .
All of this, I should guess. Miss Nicolson more or 
less sees, and it underlies her clear and perceptive comments 
on the "world view" of the time. But it is the nature of the 
change from that way of perceiving the world to the later 
"scientific" one that is the crux--the change that determined 
that most men of the seventeenth century would perceive a 
more external and mechanical world. And the nature of this 
change has not, I believe, been clearly understood by most 
historians of ideas, including Miss Nicolson.
One must distinguish between what one perceives (the 
given data of one's experience) and what one thinks about
^All of the following discussion of perception, t o ­
gether with the discussion of "saving the appearances," is 
based on Owen Barfield's brilliant books Saving the Appe ar­
ances and Poetic Diction, to both of which I am completely 
indebted for the basis of whatever insights into the de ve lop­
ment of consciousness in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies I might have had.
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this world he perceives. The latter process clearly starts 
from the first. If one perceives a more numinous world, that 
is the world he will reflect on (or theorize about). If one 
perceives a world of unity and a world that reveals God's 
image in macrocosm, geocosm, and microcosm, then one will, 
insofar as one theorizes at all, construct theories to account 
for or explain that world. But this is a distinction that 
Miss Nicolson has lost sight of when she comes to say that 
Ptolemaic astronomy had been for centuries man's supreme 
proof that the universe, like the soul of man, was spherical.^
Here we are back to Wotton's "saving the appearances." 
Wotton's remark, like that of Milton half a century later, is 
a harking back to an older and dying attitude toward the 
nature of truth and the relationship of speculation to that 
truth.
Or if they list to try 
Conjecture, he his Fabric of the Heav'ns 
Hath left to thir disputes, perhaps to move 
His laughter at thir quaint Opinions wide 
Hereafter, when they come to model Heav'n 
And calculate the Stars, how they will wield 
The mighty frame, how build, unbuild, contrive 
To save appearances, how gird the sphere 
With Centric and Eccentric scribbl'd o'er.
Cycle and Epicycle, orb in orb:^
The function of astronomy was to "save the appearances," to 
"account for" the motions of the heavenly bodies. The calcu ­
lations of the astronomers, their hyp o t h e s e s , were intended
^Nicolson, op. c i t ., p. 50.
2
John Milton, Paradise L o s t , ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(New York; The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1962), p. 186.
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to give a consistency to observed change. And of course "the 
same appearances could be saved by two or more quite differ ­
ent hypotheses, such as an eccentric or an epicycle or, 
particularly in the case of Venus and Mercury, by supposed 
revolution around the earth or supposed revolution around the 
s u n .
But what was happening in King James's time was not 
merely that a new astronomy, one which saved the appearances 
by adding a new sphere, was being put forward as an hypo ­
thesis, which would have no essential relation to truth: 
the Coparnican astronomy put forth "a new theory of the 
nature of theory; namely, that, if a hypothesis saves all 
the appearances, it is identical with t r u t h . T h i s  h y p o ­
thesis ceased to be the hypothesis of which Milton wrote and 
became a theory that claimed to be in fact physically true.
Obviously Copernicus and like-minded men were b e ­
ginning to perce ive a somewhat different world from that 
described by Miss Nicolson. Nonetheless, the writings of 
Copernicus, Galileo, William Gilbert, William Harvey, and 
Francis Bacon show more than residual traces of perception 
of an animate world. The great separation of spirit and 
matter, of self and a wholly external world was yet to come. 
And it came rapidly; for theories about one's world do
^Barfield, Saving the Appear an ces (London: Faber
S Faber, 1957), p. 49.
^Ibi d . , p . 51.
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perforce affect and change one's perception of that world. 
Thus, as this new theory about the nature of theory advanced, 
man's perception of his world "advanced" with it. A theory 
that declares the final truth of the view that the world 
runs on in accordance with natural law, completely apart 
from and in spite of man himself, must, with its acceptance, 
produce a more isolated, a more self-conscious, a more in­
ternalized man. And this man perceives a vastly different 
world from that of the early Renaissance man.
If, from this point, one looks back on the earlier 
characterization of the world of the Renaissance by Miss 
Nicolson, he sees that, perceptive and suggestive as it is, 
it has actually reversed the positions of the "pre-scien- 
tific" and the "scientific" ages vis-à-vis theories about 
the world man lives in. As a description of pe rc e p t i o n , it 
is accurate; as a description of the attitude toward scien­
tific theory, it is not. "Modern cosmology," she says, "is 
based on analogy. But we are aware that it is an analogy." 
Perhaps we are; but modern cosmology has, after all, grown 
out of and largely maintained the same theory about the 
nature of theory that grew up in the seventeenth century.
And the men of the seventeenth century were not aware of the 
analogy, because it was not held to be one--not finally. The 
scientific pronouncements on the nature of the universe were 
maintained as true, simply and wholly. The new astronomers 
were not saving the appearances, whereas the earlier
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cosmology, based of course on a perception of the reality of 
the unity of man and the universe, was a conscious construc­
tion, based solely, as construction, on analogy, in an 
attempt to save the appearances.
We need not wonder too much, then, at the seeming in­
congruity between the growing uncertainty and instability, 
and the diminished sense of Tragedy in the drama of the 
seventeenth century. The neroic play which mostly defines 
neo-classical Tragedy seems, indeed, to be the logical ou t ­
come of the development here briefly described. It is our
best example of the true implications for Tragedy of the 
ch ange.^
As man continued to study the external world of laws 
and motion through his "fantastic glass," his view of himself 
seemed to be taken from the reverse end; and as the glass 
grew in power, he shrank ever smaller, and receded farther 
into the distance. This was a world from which he was cut 
off, and any connections with which he could only feign with 
his diverting, but inconsequential instrument poetry.^ No
^There are, of course, many other elements that con­
tributed to the development of the heroic drama, but the ce n ­
tral one seems to me to be the one defined here. And since 
the present attempt is not to develop fully the contributing 
strands that produced heroic drama, but to isolate the reasons 
why it is not Tragedy (and thereby better to understand both 
it and Tragedy), consideration of these other contributing 
factors would be irrelevant.
^In The Seventeenth Century Background (London: Chatto 
& Windus, 1953), Basil Willey points out that "Prose was for 
conveying what was felt to be true, and was addressed to the 
judgment; poetry was for conveying pleasure, and was addressed
104
real identity could be made, no justification from a simply 
physical universe hoped for. These are more our thoughts 
than his: they are thoughts about what were for him per cep­
tions .
How is this man to perceive the tragic situation of 
man? What will he see the mortal condition to be? What is 
the evil he discerns? There is, of course, no possibility 
of the noble and vaulting declaration that Justice is one 
and his, that his notion of justice coincides with that of 
an external and purely physical universe. For him evil can­
not be revealed as a mysterious linking of himself and the 
cosmos, terrible as that revelation might be. Neither can 
he, in consequence, emerge as the paradoxical champion of 
Justice, wreaking vengeance on his own head in his heroic 
attempt to rid the universe of Evil.
His world is narrowed to self and society. He turns 
inward on himself, and there in his introspection he finds 
the diminished subject of his study and the source of his 
tr agedy .
Of course he still experiences evil; he is mortal 
and must be aware of the suffering to which that mortality 
can lead. But the evil is vastly reduced, drained of all 
(or all but all) cosmic and supernatural force. And the
to the fa nc y" (p. 88). This split was caused by the dualism
between truth, as apprehended only by mathematics, and 
feeling, the characteristic response of the human being.
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battleground is no longer the whole world, both objective and 
subjective, natural and supernatural, spiritual and physical: 
it is now himself, a strictly subjective and insular self 
(or at best the structured forms of self provided by society). 
There were, in general, two kinds of certainty for the man 
of the seventeenth century: one internal, the other ex­
ternal.^ The latter, or external, certainty was the province 
and product of mathematics. It was concerned with the world 
of mechanical causation (truth), and mathematics was the only 
tool for finding its reality, the only way to see things-in- 
themselves, for only mathematics was real. The other, or 
internal, certainty was the one on which he could exercise 
his reason, for it was the world of morals or ethics, which 
answered to the light of reason. In this limited sphere of 
private and public "self," this sphere of psychology, actu- 
ally--here was the battleground of man against evil.
But the evil was wholly internal. "Passion and 
reason self-division cause" might well stand as the n e o ­
classic poet's definition of Tragedy. In the world he p e r ­
ceived, the struggle was all within. The mystery that we 
find in purest Tragedy was not perceived, or rendered. The 
two halves of man were at war: therein lay the evil he knew
"tragically." As we know, this self-division is indeed part 
of the Mortal Condition that defeats man in Tragedy. What
^Cf. Willey, op. cit.. Chapter IV.
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denied the farther reaches of Tragedy to the neo-classics 
was the equation of self-division and Mortal Condition.
The resultant drama tended to be a latter-day psy- 
chomachy. Man himself was the battlefield and his warring 
halves were the contestants. Love and honor, passion and 
reason became essentially allegorical figures, as one would 
expect. And in his attempt to extend the struggle, the 
writer of heroic drama tended to make the various characters 
themselves allegorical; each figure tended toward a repre­
sentation of one or the other of the halves of divided man. 
Thus the more the poet proliferated the characters in the 
struggle (an internal struggle), the more difficult it became 
to keep any kind of tragic focus; the more the play tended 
toward rant. No amount of bravado, no amount of rhetoric, 
no amount of pseudo-Elizabethan imagery could change the 
play from what it was--a psychomachy. To be sure, the writers 
of the period tried to change it. They still felt that there 
was a kinship between themselves and the Elizabethans (and 
with the later Elizabethans indeed there was). So they in­
voked spirits, declared cosmic ramifications of the actions 
of their characters, and extravagantly plastered over their 
works with imagery that attempted to recall a less mechanical 
world ; but all these attempts must seem finally to be untrue 
and artificial. The world they perceived could admit no 
such extension of meaning to man's actions. The focus was 
too narrow, the scope too limited. Man's world was an
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internal one, and no amount of posturing could make it ot h e r ­
wise. Moreover, since this was so, the actions and figures 
could bring no expanding and deepening symbolic force: they
were allegorical only, and schematized only that world of 
perception which gave them rise.^
One can find, I think, no better example of this 
failing of the heroic tragedy than Dryden's All for L o v e . 
Dryden is the best writer of "serious drama" of the last 
half of the seventeenth century in England, and perhaps of 
the entire neo-classical age. And this is surely Dryden's 
best play: it is carefully and lovingly constructed, and
contains his best dramatic poetry. Moreover, since it is 
free of the grosser faults and flaws of the drama of the 
time, since it reveals the best that Dryden could do in the 
way of Tragedy, the nearest thing to Tragedy that the age had 
to offer, it is a better example than the weaker, more 
notorious, more bombastic plays, for one can keep his focus 
on the one question and not be misled by more obvious (and 
less central for our purposes) faults of the play. Here we 
can view heroic tragedy at its best, and therefore see just 
what it is and what it is not much better than by viewing the 
type at its worst. And finally, because All for Love is a
^One obvious effect of this process was an o v e r ­
simplification of character, for the more they became alle­
gorical figures, the less the characters were likely to be 
complex persons. Compare, for example, D r y d e n 's Cleopatra 
with Shakesoeare's .
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very good play, no doubt the best piece of "serious drama" 
in English between 1542 and the twentieth century--then we 
can reveal its shortcomings as Tragedy without the risk of 
confusing this demonstration with a judgment either that the 
play is bad or that a very good play of this type is ther e­
fore Tragedy.
Obviously the story of Antony and Cleopatra is, in 
itself, a kind of embodiment of the conflict between passion 
and reason. However, the extent to which the poet emphasizes 
this feature of the story is solely within the discretion of 
the poet. Clearly Dryden chose to make it the heart of his 
play. The theme of the play might well be Antony's ex cl ama­
tion "0 my distracted soul !"  ^ The Antony of this play, the 
soul of this Antony is literally pulled apart. He is c on ­
stantly torn between the demands of honor and reason, love 
and passion. In every way Dryden draws attention to this 
sundering of Antony. He identifies Rome with reason and 
honor, and Egypt with love and passion. He has Antony torn 
between the attractions of two women, one his wife Octavia,
who carries with her an atmosphere of reason and honor; the
2
other, Cleopatra, who is all in all love and passion. He
^John Dryden, All for L o v e , in Works of John D r y d e n , 
ed. Sir Walter Scott and George Saintsbury Tl8 vols.; E d i n ­
burgh: W. Paterson, 1882), V, 390.
2
As Cleopatra says of herself to Iras, when the latter 
asks her to call reason to her aid: "I have none./And none
would have; my love's a noble madness . . ." ( I b i d . , p. 361).
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makes Antony's inner conflict the cause and scene of the 
struggle between Ventidius, the reasonable and honorable 
Roman soldier, and Alexas, Cleopatra's Pandarus. And he 
also makes Antony's person the battleground for the struggle 
between Caesar (cold and boyish) and Cleopatra. In short, 
the conflict within Antony is extended both spatially and 
fragmentarily into the other major characters. At all points 
one cannot help being aware that the contending persons are 
at bottom representatives of one or the other of the strug­
gling halves of Antony. And the action of the play serves 
as a diagram of the vacillation between these two poles of 
his person that marks the life of Dryden's Antony.
To this extent, then, the play is a psychomachy, an 
allegorical charting of the war within. But Dryden attempts 
to extend it. By identifying Antony with Mars and Cleopatra 
with Venus, and by stressing that the Antony who gives him­
self over to passion and love is the ruler of half mankind 
while the reasonable Caesar rules the other half, Dryden 
manages to suggest that the struggle within Antony is a uni­
versal one, that man is by nature torn between two super- 
naturally great inclinations, and must, therefore, be pulled 
apart. Here is the mortal condition of neo-classic tragedy. 
It is this against which the tragic hero must struggle. But 
if the tragic note is sounded by touching what is truly one 
of the strings of the Mortal Condition, its sound is muffled 
within Marc Antony, and no echoes or vibrations are felt in
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our own souls. The extension of the conflict remains an 
allegorical one, and the struggle remains within Antony. 
Moreover, although we know the self-division of Antony to be 
part of mortal man's problem, we also know that it is a very 
limited part. Antony's struggle gives us no sense of the 
determination to rise above the Mortal Condition that Shake­
speare's Antony and Cleopatra does. No attack is made on it 
in All for Lo ve. For all practical purposes, Dryden's 
Antony is a passive battleground, as are all the heroes of 
heroic tragedy; and their hysterical attempts to assert th em ­
selves only argue some kind of awareness by the playwrights 
of this fact. This play reveals no significantly tragic 
involvement and particularly no strong commitment to any 
ideal. The ideal is (as, I believe, it is in heroic drama 
generally) alternately passion and reason. It would be 
difficult to argue convincingly that the ideal is simply a 
life without the split, though this would be a significant 
commitment. But something of the kind does seem to be the 
closest we can come to what Antony is engaged to seek.^
At the end, then, the suicides of Antony and C l e o ­
patra do not bring home the tragic recognition. The active 
engagement with the Mortal Condition is missing. They merely 
continue helpless in its grasp and despair of living so,
^I should say, by contrast, that this is more or 
less what both Antony and Cleopatra attempt to establish in 
Shakespeare's play.
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which is a far different thing from failing to live so b e ­
cause one willfully attacks that which, by virtue of the 
Mortal Condition, he maintains. From the essential passivity 
of these figures comes neither the mystery of suffering and 
defeat nor the paradox of spiritual elevation.
What one does seem to get from the play is a realiza­
tion that reason, the grand ideal of the age, is no security 
against the destructiveness of man's natural division.
Alexas, who is "reason undisturbed,"^ has brought much of 
the destruction to pass. His undisturbed reason, when it 
attempted to resolve the dichotomy of man's soul, could only 
accentuate the split and bring the suffering inherent in it 
to fruition. These, certainly , are the seeds of Tragedy, 
but they are planted in no tragic figure, nor nourished by 
any vision of the Mortal Condition. Thus they lie dormant, 
or else issue forth as a brief, melancholy lament on the age.
Dryden came close to Tragedy in All for L o v e . And 
the general excellence of the drama, and the many beauties 
of the poetry almost make one accept it as a successful 
attempt. But even though he looked steadily and hard at the 
Mortal Condition, he saw it through the glass provided by 
the seventeenth century. The evil he saw man contesting with 
was an evil within, and only within. No tragic figure could 
seek to chase Evil into the corner of the world and then find
^ I b i d . , p . 353.
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himself that corner. Evil, and all else of man's problems, 
had already retreated into a span, from which he could not 
get them out. The eyes had turned inward, and what they saw 
suggested no connections with infinity, no dealing with 
immortality, no mystery. The world of man was finite 
indeed; within these limits Tragedy could not find room.
AFTERWORD
It should come as no great surprise to one, if, in 
his application of the definition o f  T r a g e d y  h e r e  o u t l i n e d , 
he should discover that examples of pure Tragedy are rela­
tively few. The discovery has been made by the sensibilities
of generation after generation of readers. The problem has
been to find a way of clarifying and defending these dis­
coveries. Furthermore, judged by even the loosest of c r i ­
teria, the dramatic literature of the world can show only a
small percentage of what we have been accustomed to call 
Tragedy.
Neither should one conclude that because pure Tragedy 
is not plentiful the class is too near empty to be of any 
practical use. Few literary forms are pure. And the epic, 
at least, is a genre that is ordinarily held to offer at 
best a handful of more or less pure examples. Students of 
Tragedy are often puzzled by the great differences among 
so-called Tragedies, and find themselves at a loss to see the 
essential likeness. I believe the present definition can be 
of assistance to them in these quandries. Obviously the lack 
of a clear understanding of the nature of Tragedy prevents 
one's discovering the real differences among "Tragedies"; it
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prevents one's being able to determine which are truly 
Tragedies, though perhaps flawed, and which are works of 
another kind, fine though they may be. This isolating of 
the nature of Tragedy, therefore, is very valuable in any 
attempt to find out what is the center of interest and 
nature of comment of a particular work which obviously deals 
with the predicament of moral, mortal man.
Finally, there has been much speculation in the 
past about the kinds of ages during which Tragedy can appear. 
And interest in the question appears to be growing. Such a 
definition as this one should be a valuable aid in any such 
investigation, which, of course, it has been no part of my 
purpose to conduct here.
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